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Effectiveness of the international refugee protection regimes: the case of 2015 refugee crisis 
Even though the most recent, and one of the greatest refugee crises in Europe is gradually ceasing, 
it has certainly revealed numerous underlying issues within the European Union (EU) and its 
Member States. The magnitude and the intensity of the 2015 refugee crisis put to test the 
international refugee protection regimes and their effectiveness to quickly neutralize the crisis. 
Having said that, this work will attempt to address one of the main challenges that had been faced 
by the international community in the last six years – the overwhelming influx of refugees, and its 
impact on the effectiveness and the functioning of international refugee protection regimes. 
Unprecedented scale of migrant flows, heightened regime complexity and lack of solidarity among 
involved actors are just some of the factors that have greatly impacted the course of the crisis in 
Europe, and the manner in which the crisis has been resolved. The main contribution of this 
research is the generalizability of this analysis – the institutional and systematic issues that have 
been revealed throughout the refugee crisis have been around before the crisis itself. Whereas the 
focus of most refugee crisis-related research is on the narrowed-down, refugee-specific aspects, 
this research leaves more space for widespread application of findings to other fields of research. 
The refugee crisis is only the spark, which has caused the perfect storm of failed burden-sharing, 
normative flaws and flawed decision-making, all of which can transcend into any other form of 
crisis, and another system of regimes. 
Keywords: refugee protection regime, refugee crisis, regime complexity, regime theory, burden-
sharing. 
 
Učinkovitost mednarodnih režimov za zaščito beguncev: Primer begunske krize leta 2015 
Čeprav zadnja in ena največjih begunskih kriz v Evropi zlagoma pojenja, je vsekakor razkrila 
številne temeljne težave v Evropski uniji (EU) in njenih članicah. Razsežnost in moč begunske 
krize iz leta 2015 je na preizkus postavila mednarodne sisteme za zaščito beguncev in njihovo 
učinkovitost pri minimalizaciji posledic krize. Zavoljo tega pričujoče delo naslavlja enega izmed 
glavnih izzivov, s katerim se je spopadla mednarodna skupnost v zadnjih šestih letih: prevelik 
pritok beguncev in njegov vpliv na učinkovitost in delovanje mednarodnih sistemov begunske 
zaščite. Najbolj obsežni begunskih tokovi do zdaj, povečana kompleksnost režimov in 
pomanjkanje solidarnosti med vključenimi, so samo nekateri od faktorjev, ki so v veliki meri 
vplivali na potek krize v Evropi in na način njenega reševanja. Glavni doprinos te raziskave je 
možnost posplošitve njene analize – institucionalne in sistemske težave, ki so se pokazale med 
begunsko krizo, so v resnici obstajale že pred njo. Medtem ko je večina raziskav v povezavi z 
begunci osredotočena na omejene in specifične aspekte begunstva, pričujoča raziskava ponuja več 
možnosti za razširjeno uporabo izsledkov tudi na druga raziskovalna področja. Begunska kriza je 
samo vzvod, ki je povzročil zaporedje neuspešnih delitev bremen, neustrezne norme in 
pomanjkljive odločitve, ki se lahko nadaljujejo v katero koli drugo obliko krize in v drugačen 
sistem režimov. 
Ključne besede: sistemi za zaščito beguncev, begunska kriza, kompleksnost režimov, teorija 
režimov, delitev bremen.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Even though the peak of the most recent, and one of the greatest refugee crises in Europe has been 
relatively settled down, it has certainly revealed numerous underlying issues within the European 
Union (EU) and its Member States. Some of those issues are not exclusively related to the refugee 
protection regimes, but they have surfaced in the light of those events, demonstrating the flaws of 
some long-standing organisations, the EU and the United Nations (UN). Hence, the relevance of 
the said crises is still high, as it revealed institutional problems that need work in order to properly 
address new potential challenges in the future. Having said that, in this work, I will attempt to 
address one of the main challenges that had been faced by the international community in the last 
six years – the overwhelming influx of refugees, and its impact on the effectiveness and the 
functioning of international refugee protection regimes.  
Among many theoretical works in IR, Susan Strange (1982) and Jack Donnelly (1986) each bring 
their individual definition of regime analysis. Previously, regime analysis was largely used in the 
study of International Political Economy (IPE) as a tool for analysis of economic regimes. With 
the increase in number of non-economic international regimes, regime analysis gained value in 
other fields, such as political science and International Relations (Donnelly, 1986, p. 641). As a 
result, regime analysis has developed as a useful framework in international relations, applied for 
issue-specific and thorough examination of roles, elements and successes of international regimes 
(ibid., p. 642). 
Despite constant efforts to properly address and find universally applicable solutions for the 
displacement of peoples, the international community still faces many challenges and conflicting 
views on the existing systems and processes. As a result, an extensive amount of literature has 
developed throughout the years, assessing the dynamics between international regimes, institutions 
and factors influencing the effectiveness of those regimes (i.e. Alter and Meunier, 2009; Betts, 
2013; Holzer, 2013). These matters have been discussed in various disciplines, such as 
international law, political science, sociology and migration studies (i.e. Lippert, 1999; Castles, 
2004; Juss, 2005; Betts, 2009). Each of these disciplines provides us with somewhat different 
analyses and angles from which international regimes and their power have been viewed. Experts 
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have looked at the manners in which international regimes are shaped and created, and how 
successful they are at creating a comprehensive, burden-sharing environment for all the involved 
actors (Noallkaemper, 2013). When it comes to the debate on the challenges and the effectiveness 
of international regimes within the field of International Relations (IR), two major schools lead 
the way – realism and liberalism (Noallkaemper, 2013; Park, 2015). In this sense, realism defines 
regimes as “the existence of many sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge” (Keohane, 1982, p. 325). 
Conversely, liberalism identifies regimes as set of norms and rules that encourage “cooperation 
between states with mutual interests which would result in absolute gains for all participants” 
(Stoyanov, 2012). These two schools of thought have largely influenced the development of 
regime theory, which, in IR, is focused primarily around the “complex interaction between states, 
organizations, corporations”, and its ability to influence behaviors within the international system 
(Hopkins and Meiches, 2012). 
Therefore, through the utilization of regime analysis, I plan to examine in more detail, the elements 
of international refugee protection regimes, both which strengthen and weaken the existing refugee 
protection systems. I will address the following question – How effectively have existing 
international refugee protection regimes addressed and resolved the 2015 refugee crisis? 
This question is important for several reasons. Firstly, it looks at the big picture, which is often 
overlooked in the process of resolving an issue. Norms, principles, rules and other procedures 
responsible for refugee protection are focused on their individual successes, and neglect to see the 
collective effectiveness or ineffectiveness of different refugee protection regimes. So, this question 
allows the readers to understand the wider context of international refugee protection and see how 
those individual regimes function as a whole. Secondly, in order to successfully address the 
research question, this work has to analyze every refugee protection regime on a universal (UN) 
and regional (EU) level, and the history of the same, to create well-rounded understanding of the 
necessity for existence of each of those regimes. Thirdly, the question necessitates for the issue of 
hierarchy and overlapping regimes to be examined, as to prove of disapprove the functionality of 
different international refugee regime elements. Thus, the question looks at diverse groups of 
factors, which altogether, create a detailed response and a high-quality outlook on the 
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discrepancies between theoretical and actual effectiveness of international refugee protection 
regimes.   
In this work, the research done will cover several topics in order to answer to the posed research 
question. Overall, the research will amount to the main subject of this work, which is the critical 
analysis of the authoritative and functional nature of the international refugee protection regimes 
(Feller, 2001; Juss, 2005; Alter and Meunier, 2009). By looking at the complex, multi-layered 
system of overlapping regimes, this thesis will provide an insight into the reality of their collective 
effectiveness. To examine the capabilities of the said regimes, the chosen case study of the 2015 
refugee crisis in Europe serves as the contemporary and highly challenging example, through 
which both the power and failures of the international refugee protection regimes are 
demonstrated. Having such example, which is still largely happening on the European territory, 
sets excellent grounds for critical analysis and practical application of different regimes for refugee 
protection.  
When it comes to the case study, the period covered will range roughly from 2011 until 2018. The 
importance of the year 2015 lies in the fact that it is the year that many scholars identify as the 
year in which the refugee crisis has peaked in Europe, moving into 2016 as well (Park, 2015; 
Dobra, 2016, p. 92; van Prooijen, Krouwel and Emmer, 2017, p. 143). Justification behind the 
choice of the year 2011 is in the history of the crisis – with the 2010-2011 Arab Spring uprisings, 
the crisis began to take place soon after (Doomen, 2013, p. 400). By offering a historical context 
of the crisis and the origins of the refugees that have been coming to Europe, the research adds 
understanding to different aspects of the material discussed, such as the incoming routes and 
challenges that have come about with the crisis.  
To provide a well-rounded understanding and analysis of different aspects of this research, sources 
used will be both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources, which will be used throughout 
the paper, are documents such as the 1951 Geneva Convention, the Dublin Regulations, and the 
European Convention on Human Rights. These documents will provide detailed norms and rules 
that characterize the international refugee protection regimes. Aside from different treaties and 
conventions, other primary sources used will be databases of several international institutions, 
which are directly involved in the refugee aid and crisis management (e.g. United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, European Union). Similarly, various briefs, reports and such papers 
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published by the relevant institutions throughout the crisis will certainly serve as significant 
sources of information. More importantly, these papers contain analyses directly relating to the 
treaties and goals of certain international regimes, hence highlighting potential pitfalls of 
resolutions and aid missions. In regard to secondary sources, various analysis and research works 
will be utilized in order to present different attitudes and points of view, hence creating a well-
rounded and argued work.  
Possible limitations regarding the goals and research in this work are primarily in the research 
methods and timeframe chosen. When it comes to research methods, although detailed analysis of 
primary and secondary sources provides with plenty of material, having face-to-face interviews 
would certainly add greater understanding to certain aspects of this work. Nonetheless, due to 
several technical reasons, having interviews as a chosen method is not plausible. Furthermore, the 
subject of this work is largely focused on a phenomenon which is ongoing – while the refugee 
crisis may have calmed down, it is still happening, and is still posing some of the same challenges 
that will be discussed in this thesis. Consequently, some of the data will not be fully available. In 
order to minimize the effect of this issue, the chosen end of the timeline analyzed in the thesis is 
2018, in the effort that the material provided in this thesis will be sufficient to offer contemporary 
and useful analysis and conclusions to the problems.  
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2 EVOLUTION OF TERM ‘REFUGEE’ AND THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES 
 
The aim of this Chapter is to introduce the historical progression and development of international 
refugee protection regimes, from the very beginning, all the way to the highly-complex, multi-
layered systems of norms, principles and rules which navigate the behavior of different actors 
today. It will show how the fundamental values and ideas of contemporary international refugee 
protection came to be.  Moreover, the most relevant international documents establishing the said 
regimes will be examined in Subchapter 2.1, such as the 1951 Geneva Convention, the Dublin 
Regulations, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS). The historical development, role and the effectiveness of each of the documents 
will be assessed. Evolution of these international refugee protection regimes will also be analyzed 
against historical events and phenomena, which make the said regimes what they are today. This 
examination and analysis of the regimes will amount to the understanding of their extent and 
degree of authority can be established and the remaining research can be presented further in the 
paper. 
Since ancient times, a concept similar to today’s refugees had existed, where states have accepted 
fleeing groups of individuals onto their territory, providing them with a temporary sanctuary away 
from their native country. 
Nevertheless, even several centuries later, up to 1920, the need for proper definition of refugee 
and provision of their rights was neglected (Hathaway, 1984, p. 348). The main reason for this was 
mere scramble for self-determination and relatively small number of migrations that had actually 
been recorded, amongst otherwise uncontrolled movements of people prior to the first half of the 
20th century (Hathaway, 1984, p. 348). Moreover, the refugee movements were not known for as 
they are today. More so, refugees as we know them today “came into being as the category refugee 
was being invented” (Lippert, 1999, p. 299). 
Only after the First World War and the Russian Revolution, political leaders had faced the 
“massive groups of people who had been dislocated” (Hathaway, 1984, p. 348), while 
simultaneously being urged by the international relief organizations to form a high commissioner 
for refugees under the League of Nations (Lippert, 1999, p. 300). Thus, in 1921, the first official 
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definition of a refugee was formulated, with the League of Nation’s appointment of Dr Fridtjof 
Nansen as the first High Commissioner for Russian refugees (Feller, 2001, p. 584). In contrast to 
the modern, rather individualistic definition of a refugee, the initial definition was concerned with 
juridical principles, which considered refugees as “persons outside their State of origin who have 
been effectively deprived of the formal protection of their government” (Hathaway, 1984, p. 349). 
This approach to refugee definition and categorization did not provide any further protection and 
responsibility of the host state more than a mere justification for their displacement. League of 
Nations’ efforts to solve the crisis of Russian refugees had peaked in 1922, with the provision of 
mandatory travel documents for the Russian refugees that were fleeing from the famine and 
conflict (Hathaway, 1984, p. 352). The so-called ‘Nansen passports’1 enabled the refugees to flee 
to a country of first reception in order to seek better life conditions.  
Even though the Nansen’s mandate was later expanded to other groups of refugees, it was only 
after World War II that the international community faced new waves of refugees, with numbers 
never before seen (Feller, 2001, p. 130). The grave aftermath of the World War II had caused for 
the “patchwork fashion” (Triola, 2014, p. 1) of the international refugee regime development to 
become very apparent. The international community had, from the very beginning of the refugee 
regime, failed to foresee many issues and concerns with the founding documents (Triola, 2014, p. 
1). The disadvantages of the original refugee categorization came to light as the International 
Refugee Organization (IRO) struggled to successfully manage refugees all over Europe. The 
international leaders quickly learned that the previous approach to refugees is not nearly sufficient 
to cover the multidimensional nature of the refugees’ and the host countries’ needs (Feller, 2001, 
p. 130). The need for a highly functional and versatile refugee protection system resulted in the 
establishment of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), main 
responsibility of which was to “provide international protection for refugees and to seek permanent 
solutions to their problems by assisting governments to facilitate their voluntary repatriation or 
their assimilation within new national communities” (Feller, 2001, pp. 130–131). With the 
improvement of the responsible institutions for refugees, the definition of refugee had to be 
improved as well. The efforts to create an international system granting equal participation of all 
members and high-quality treatment of displaced persons amounted to the creation of the Geneva 
                                                 
1 Refugee travel documents issued by the League of Nations to stateless refugees, named after the Dr Fridtjof Nansen, 
the first High Commissioner for Russian refugees.  
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Convention of 1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees with its 1967 Protocol (Feller, 2001, p. 131; 
Triola, 2014, p. 1; Havlova and Tamchynova, 2016). The 1951 Convention provided a new 
definition and categorization of refugees and displaced persons, hence becoming a universally 
accepted, base document which “provides the most comprehensive codification of the rights of 
refugees at the international level” (UNHCR, 1951, p. 3)2. According to the Convention, a refugee 
is an individual “unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin”, due to a justified fear of 
“being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group, or political opinion” (UNHCR, 1951, p. 3). While previous definitions had never comprised 
the concern for the individual person but rather the group that would seek refuge, the 1951 
Convention also emphasized the non-discrimination principle, which was not considered in the 
previous definitions (Hathaway, 1984, p. 350). It managed to take in account every aspect of a 
single person that should be attended to, eliminating almost no space for discrimination and unfair 
treatment.  
 
2.1 International refugee protection norms and regulations  
Since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the UN’s vital entities in regard 
to the protection of refugees, the international community has developed several treaties, 
conventions, and other legal instruments for refugee protection. These have both global and 
regional reach, with the intent of fully tackling potential challenges of future refugees and asylum 
seekers as well. Accordingly, most important internationally accepted sets of norms and 
regulations created in order to protect individuals seeking refuge and asylum are the above-
mentioned Geneva Convention of 1951 on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Dublin Regulation and the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS) (Park, 2015; Havlova and Tamchynova, 2016; UNHCR, n.d., p. 1). Each of these 
regimes were created at different times and in order to answer to challenges not faced previously. 
As a regional power working closely with the UN, the European Union (EU) has taken on the 
creation of new and more Europe-concentrated refugee protection regimes, as majority of recent 
refugee migration patterns go through European and EU territory. Ideally, all of the regulatory 
                                                 
2 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed 28 July 1951 in Geneva, in power since 22 April 1954. 
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documents listed would complement each other, hence creating an impermeable refugee protection 
system. However, the higher the number of existing regimes is, the complexity of their dynamics 
also rises (Alter and Meunier, 2009), which will be discussed in more detail later in this work.  
2.1.1 UNHCR and the 1951 Geneva Convention  
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established in 1951, after its 
predecessor’s International Refugee Organization’s (I.R.O.) three-year mandate expired. 
According to David Kennedy (1986), “/t/he establishment of the U.N.H.C.R. was a compromise 
between those who believed that an intergovernmental agency should carry on the work of the 
I.L.O. and those who sought to shift the burden to front-line European states and voluntary 
agencies” (p. 3). Both entities were founded in order to take over the responsibility of the 
overwhelming flows of refugees across the post-war Europe, however, the UNHCR’s role 
immediately became much more complex, although its functions were narrowed down to solely 
refugee protection (Kennedy, 1986, pp. 3–4). Initially, the UNHCR’s work was to be principally 
legal, thus non-political, ensuring that the legal rights of the refugees under the 1951 Convention 
be honored (Kennedy, 1986, p. 4). Moreover, “ ‘protection’ was to be an international legal bridge 
between periods of national sovereign assimilation. /…/. Therefore, the administration of the 
definition of refugee became a form of ‘protection’ at least to the extent that a person classified as 
a "refugee" had a clear legal status at international law” (ibid.).  
In the beginning, UNHCR’s work was oriented around “determining who was a bona fide3 
"refugee" and advocating national resettlement of refugees”, providing them with arranged care 
and settlement (Kennedy, 1986, p. 4). Basically, “/t/he U.N.H.C.R. ‘protected’ refugees by 
identifying them”, which also meant providing travel documents and promoting different legal 
statuses for them (ibid., pp. 4–5). UNHCR’s identification of a refugee is given at the very 
beginning of the document, as its basic provision, where it is also stated how “/d/ecisions of non-
eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during the period of its activities shall 
not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfill the conditions /…/” (1951 
Geneva Convention, 1951, Article 1). According to Bwakira (2001), “UNHCR's activities during 
                                                 
3 According to the Legal Information Institute, it is a Latin term meaning "good faith".  This refers to an individual's 
position under the law that is based in good faith without notice of fraud with regards to a particular transaction or 
with regards to the authenticity of a particular document. 
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this initial period are often described as having been reactive, exile-oriented and refugee-specific” 
(p. 279). They are considered reactive because mainly, UNHCR’s dealing with refugees happened 
in the country of asylum. Next, the early activities are seen as exile-oriented because the problem-
solving processes were focused on the countries of asylum, not on those states which were 
producing refugees in the first place. And last, refugee-specific, because in its initial stages, the 
UNHCR did not acknowledge nor work with any other forms of forcibly displaced persons 
(Bwakira, 2001, p. 279).  
Certainly, with continuing displacements of individuals and groups of people, the UNHCR’s 
responsibilities have increased with time. By gradually integrating itself as a crucial part of 
international law, and disassociating its work from financial and political spheres, the UNHCR 
gained a strong, universal position among other international players (ibid.). This notion of its 
universality was even further strengthened with one of the fundamental provisions in the 1951 
Convention, which is Article 3 on non-discrimination, stating that the host countries are obliged 
to “apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion 
or country of origin” (United Nations 1951 Geneva Convention, Article 3). Moreover, in those 
initial years of UNHCR’s work, “/p/rotection began with certification rather than with flight and 
sought its origins in aspects of the individual refugee's situation rather than in his native context. 
Protection ended not at the satisfactory solution of the refugee's difficulties, but at the moment of 
his successful legal " ‘re-assimilation’ to a national legal regime” (Kennedy, 1986, p. 5).  
According to Kennedy (1986), an unexpected change of migration trends in the period 1960 – 
1980 had brought the change in the nature of UNHCR’s work as well (p. 5). This change happened 
with growing south-south migrations, changing the geographic and demographic aspects of 
refugee protection work. Consequently, “/a/ssistance, rather than protection, /had/ come to 
comprise by far the greatest portion of the U.N.H.C.R.’s work” (Kennedy, 1986, pp. 5–6). The 
former understanding of the refugees, their needs and proper assistance had no practical use, thus 
the need for new context and way of work quickly became a new reality for the UNHCR. Such an 
increase in responsibility and a widened area of work brought about some fundamental changes, 
(Kennedy, 1986, pp. 6–7):  
Legal determination of refugee status, once an end in itself, now often seems to be merely a 
bureaucratic prerequisite to assistance. /…/ For the protection of refugees, the Office seems to 
rely far more heavily upon sophisticated political negotiation and the provision of financial or 
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technical assistance in specific cases than upon uniform legal standards. Protection officers now 
readily acknowledge the political nature of their work and are willing to negotiate a wide range 
of solutions beyond those expressly mandated by the instruments whose ratification they publicly 
urge.  
 
Simultaneously, the Cold War era had also affected the scope and the nature of UNHCR’s work. 
During that era, many refugee policies were concentrated on granting protection to anyone 
escaping communism (Kennedy, 1986, p. 4; Juss, 2005, p. 758). With the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989 and the end of communism, the course of shaping of the refugee policies had changed as 
well. As stated by Juss (2005, pp. 758–759), the effects of it were threefold:  
First, the fall of Communism led to the lifting of exit controls in Eastern European countries. /…/ 
The Berlin Wall fell and the largest movement of populations across the borders of nation states 
began in Europe since the Second World War. Second, the opening of borders led to mass refugee 
movements in a way that led Western European countries to question their liberal asylum and 
immigration policies. /../. Third, and most importantly, the ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
resulting directly from the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, produced hundreds of 
thousands of bona fide refugees. 
 
In the Post-Cold War era, the profile of refugees had changed, as the movements did as well. As 
it was stated above, most of the refugees after the end of Cold War and communism traveled from 
the former East Bloc to the Western countries. Aside from large numbers of refugees, the Eastern 
Bloc countries were generally poor and of lower status, which was another concern that had to be 
attended to (Juss, 2005, p. 759). Seeking new approaches to refugee assistance and protection, the 
power of the UNHCR was demonstrated by its institutional adaptability, which became a crucial 
aspect of its work, with so many shifts and challenges throughout the history. Because of its very 
specific definition of a ‘refugee’ and the corresponding rights, and because of the introduction of 
new legal principles and norms, 1951 Convention had changed the way that the refugees had been 
understood and managed prior to 1951. In accordance with the initially promoted humanitarian 
and individualistic approach to the protection of the refugees, the 1951 Convention has coined the 
principle of non-refoulement4, crucial for the extended protection of the refugees’ rights, as well 
as their lives (Facchini, Lorz and Willmann 2006, p. 414). Under the umbrella of the broadened, 
individualistic protection of refugees also fall Article 27 and Article 28, which oblige the 
                                                 
4According to Article 33 (1) of the 1951 Geneva Convention, the principle of non-refoulement holds that “No 
Contracting State shall expel of return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories 
where his life or freedom would be threatened /…/” (p. 30)  
16 
 
Contracting States to “issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory who does not possess 
a valid travel document” (1951 Geneva Convention, 1951, Article 27), and to “issue to refugees 
lawfully staying in their territory documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory” (1951 
Geneva Convention, 1951, Article 28). These articles certainly demonstrate the institutional effort 
that has been put forward to create a well-rounded protection system for any refugee within the 
borders of Contracting States. Be that as it may, despite the fact that the UNHCR’s work became, 
through history, politicized and less oriented solely around assistance, the original ideas and 
principles remain relevant and widely used in the refugee protection processes. 
Even so, it is important to mention how all the changes in migrant flows discussed above had 
brought about new forms of migrants, not only the reasons behind large migration flows. It had 
created additional reasons for UNHCR to establish more specific norms and monitoring systems 
which would differentiate the various categories of migrants. Subsequently, it is almost of crucial 
importance to differ refugees from economic migrants and mixed migrants, as many today have 
the tendency to overlook some essential differences between the three groups.  
Since the establishment of the 1951 Geneva Convention, there had been a remarkable increase 
when it comes to economic migrations (Bubb, Kremer and Levine, 2011, p. 368). According to 
Dustmann et al. (2017), economic migrants are “fundamentally different from refugee migrants in 
that the former not only choose whether or not to migrate, but also decide based on the constraints 
set by receiving countries, which country to migrate to given the economic benefits of this 
decision” (p. 528). Furthermore, when it comes to economic migrants, host countries have the right 
to choose the types of migrants based on their skills and field of work. With that, host countries 
can also set the length of the stay and the conditions of the economic migrant’s stay according to 
the countries’ needs (Dustmann et al., 2017, pp. 528–529). In comparison to refugees, who are 
forcefully fleeing their homelands, host countries must fulfill their duties as the signatories of the 
1951 Geneva Convention, and do not necessarily have the possiblity to choose the refugees based 
on the economic standards, but “humanitarian considerations” (Dustmann et al., 2017, p. 529).  
One of the most recent concepts that the UNHCR had developed while observing migration 
patterns and their nature is “mixed migration”, or “mixed migrants”. Having multiple meanings 
attached to the term, most comprehensible approach to explaining the term is demonstrated by 
Marina Sharpe (2018). She provides us with a two-fold definition of mixed migration: “/F/irstly, 
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mixed individual motivations for migrating, and secondly, the mixed nature of particular 
population movements or migrant communities within host States” (Sharpe, 2018, p. 119). The 
former definition means that oftentimes, different individuals move across identical routes, at the 
identical time, but with different goals of the migration. While their motivations may change in 
the process of migration, these individuals are still traveling in “mixed migratory flows” (ibid). 
The latter, however, states that the mixed migrations identify groups of people who, during and at 
the end of their migrations, find themselves in mixed communities (ibid.). Furthermore, mixed 
migrations do not necessarily exclude refugees as part of the migration flows; in mixed migrations, 
refugees are only one group among several others, e.g. victims of trafficking or economic migrants. 
Hence, mixed migration makes it more challenging for the host states to clearly differentiate 
between refugees and other migrants. As a result, “refugees are at risk of being considered 
unwelcomed irregular movers who do not deserve the rights they are conferred under international 
instruments” (van der Klaauw, 2009, p. 60). Proper differentiation and treatment of different kinds 
of migrants has certainly become a challenging task for the states. Migration complexity and 
stricter border controls established by the states, in a combination with “the pressures placed on 
asylum systems by migrants seeking employment and assumptions by States that the majority of 
asylum claims lacks credibility and is unfounded, have led to a rethinking of the relationship 
between the policy and management aspects of refugee protection and international migration” 
(ibid.). Blurred lines of contemporary migration trends have rapidly increased the need for systems 
that will address individual needs of different migrants (ibid.), and improve international refugee 
protection regimes, such as those established by the UNHCR.  
Evidently, majority the work that the UNHCR is doing is still largely grounded in the year 1954, 
when the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was officially put into power. 
Because it still remains as the central document that provides all the necessary norms, regulations 
and rights regarding refugees, the 1951 Convention established a regime of supranational 
influence. Consequently, mixed migrations and economic migrations are certainly a challenge for 
the screening processes set by the 1951 Geneva Convention, which remains the focal system when 
it comes to refugees and international protection of migrants. Often, host countries have difficulties 
deciphering between economic migrants and refugees, since most of the screening processes are 
designed for those fleeing unsafe circumstances in their homelands (Bubb, Kremer and Levine, 
2011, p. 368). As a response, Bubb, Kremer and Levine (2011) have noted the tendency of the 
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states to “to shade the performance of their obligations under the 1951 convention by increasing 
the standards of proof of their refugee status determination procedures, which are not perfectly 
contractible, resulting in more false negatives and refoulement of refugees to their place of 
persecution” (p. 368). This issue, as provided in the research done, results in lower efficiency in 
regard to admitting migrants into the host countries, and an increased gap between the host 
countries’ harmonization of refugee protection.  
Despite the discussed challenges, refugee protection and migrant protection regimes exist to 
present safety nets for different types of migrants. According to Sharpe (2018), International 
human rights law, International refugee law, International humanitarian law, Law of the Sea, and 
Transnational criminal law each have elements which provide protection to different forms of 
migrants (p. 121). Even though some of these regimes extend beyond the 1951 Geneva Convention 
and the UNHCR, they are important to mention. The International refugee law “protects refugees 
within mixed movements”, whereas the International human rights law “applies to all individuals 
on the move, regardless of nationality or statelessness” (Sharpe, 2018, p. 121). Next, as stated in 
the text (ibid.), 
International humanitarian law applies to people transiting through, or remaining in, States 
experiencing armed conflict. Transnational criminal law, in particular the Palermo Protocols on 
trafficking and smuggling, /…/ address the protection of individuals who have been trafficked or 
smuggled. Finally, the law of the sea articulates the obligations of States and shipmasters towards 
individuals in distress at sea and prohibits interception except in certain clearly defined 
circumstances. 
 
Although its work remains largely important and relevant, the UNHCR is continually faced with 
new challenges regarding its capabilities and scope of work. Also, with the expanding nature of its 
functions, the UNHCR’s authority as an international body is oftentimes put to test by the less-
willing states, which have their own interest as priority rather than obliging to certain standards 
set by the UNHCR and the 1951 Geneva Convention. Not only that, the same problem is present 
across different systems – each of the previously mentioned regimes face rather big challenges 
when it comes to practical application. This problem highlights the importance of regional regimes, 
which strengthen the already existing norms and rules, but with provisions which are adapted to 
regional needs and capacities.  
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Being the very essence of the establishment for other refugee protection regimes, the 1951 Geneva 
Convention carries an immense amount of responsibility. For instance, even if there are problems 
within regional regimes, the ultimate power and authority falls on the Convention to make changes 
and offer solutions for challenges that may arise. If that does not work, the system fails to fulfill 
its main role, and it puts at risk the whole system of regimes that have built around the Convention 
throughout time. So, although the 1951 Geneva Convention prides itself in its universality and 
adaptability, as it will be discussed in upcoming work, with the evolution of nature, direction and 
reasons of migrations, it has faced many challenges in addressing some of the issues successfully 
and in a timely manner. The reasons behind these issues seem to reveal different shortfalls of the 
international refugee regime, namely, the inability to keep up with the contemporary migrations 
which means that the definitions of a refugee or kinds of refugees are somewhat outdated or an 
even greater problem – the inability to overpower the individual state interests in state of great 
crisis, such was the 2015 refugee crisis. This being said, the final answer to these assumptions will 
be worked out throughout the subsequent chapters.  
2.1.2 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)  
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is one of the documents created and 
established from the Council of Europe, which pinpoints the organization’s scope of work. The 
convention was “adopted in 1950 and entered into force in 1953. Its ratification is a prerequisite 
for joining the Organization” (Council of Europe, 2019). Currently, Council of Europe counts 47 
members, thus 47 signatories of the Convention as well. The main purpose of the European 
Convention is to create a comprehensive system of rights and freedoms of the signatory countries, 
and to promote a higher sense of harmonization and mutual cooperation among the countries. As 
stated by the Council of Europe (2019), the Convention assists the signatory countries in: 
/r/eaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of 
justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political 
democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights 
upon which they depend. 
 
Since its establishment, the existence of other documents directed at the protection of human rights 
and prevention of degrading and inhumane treatment of human beings had brought into question 
the functionality of this treaty and whether its role is rather “excluded by the existence of other 
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instruments” (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 9). The European Human Rights Court5 had, taking in 
account the concerns, established that “the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument 
for the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied 
so as to make its safeguards practical and effective” (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 10).  
Even though the European Convention on Human Rights is mainly directed at the protection and 
promotion of human rights among the European peoples, and it does not provide a right to asylum, 
there are some provisions which expand onto the questions regarding the protection of refugees on 
the territories of signatory countries (Fullerton, 2017, p. 51). In particular, Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 of 
the EHCR; Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 and Article 4 of Protocol 7 are considered to be regarding 
the rights of the peoples other than nationals of the signatory countries. 
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that “/e/veryone’s right to life 
shall be protected by law” (European Convention of Human Rights, 1950, Article 2)6. When it 
comes to refugees and asylum, Article 2 is often read together with Article 3, “/n/o one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (ibid.). The reason 
behind this is that Article 2 did not prohibit capital punishment, hence Article 3 serves as a 
functional addition, when interpreted together (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 24). Jointly, Articles 
2 and 3 prevent for the refugees to be returned to their countries of origin, if they’re at risk of 
facing prosecution and possibly death in their homelands. According to Fullerton (2017), the 
European Human Rights Court has, throughout the decades of cases and work around the European 
Convention on Human Rights, expanded power of the document to the high seas, and added a new 
level of power to Article 3 regarding the non-refoulement rule (pp. 63–64). The text discusses a 
2012 case, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, which set the basis for the geographical expansion of the 
Convention. In this case, an Italian patrol boat had intercepted a number of small boats carrying 
hundreds of Somali and Eritrean asylum seekers, and had returned them back to their homeland, 
stripping the people of the chance to actually seek asylum in Europe. With that, “Italy had breached 
the prohibition against degrading or inhumane treatment” (p. 63). Regarding the non-refoulement 
                                                 
5
 The European Court of Human Rights is an international court set up in 1959. It rules on individual or State 
applications alleging violations of the civil and political rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Since 1998 it has sat as a full-time court and individuals can apply to it directly. (Council of Europe) 
6 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – signed 4 November 1950 in Rome, in 
power since 3 September 1953. 
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rule, the Court “has developed an expansive jurisprudence concerning the circumstances under 
which Article 3 requires non-refoulement protection for asylum seekers” (ibid.). With this, the 
Court has added more authority to Article 3, as explained by Council of Europe (2000), “/t/his 
prohibition is absolute. It permits of no justification or limitation /…/” (p. 10).  
Article 5 of the ECHR consists of a number of cases and paragraphs under which the rule applies. 
The main idea of Article 5 is the right to liberty and security, given that: “/e/veryone has the right 
to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty /…/” (European 
Convention of Human Rights, 1950, Article 8). As stated by Council of Europe, (2000), Article 5, 
together with its sub-provisions and provided cases, protects those asylum-seekers who, while 
waiting for the approval of their application, spend time in detention. It reviews whether the 
countries’ decisions to hold detainees in detention is justified or under a violation of Article 5 (p. 
43). The greatest challenge when it comes to Article 5 is that numerous asylum seekers, who arrive 
in Europe, fail to present their travel documents, or they provide the countries with false 
documentation (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 45). Consequently, “/i/f their asylum claims are 
rejected the fear is that they will abscond if not detained, but without documentation it is difficult 
to remove them” (ibid.). In one of such cases, Bozano v. France, the Court decided that “detention 
was not with a view to deportation when it was in fact to circumvent the requirements of the 
extradition procedure” (ibid.). In other words, the detention of the asylum seeker was not intended 
to result in deportation of the seeker, but to avoid the deportation completely, which was ruled as 
a violation of the Article 5.  
Unlike the previously discussed Articles, Article 6 concerns a well-being of an individual less, but 
legal rights of the same more – it is a right to a fair trial. Szewczyk (2016) maintains how the right 
to a fair trial not only exists as “a part of the common heritage of European legal systems”, it also 
“holds such a prominent place that a restrictive interpretation of Article 6 would not correspond to 
the aim and the purpose of that provision” (p. 57–58). When it comes to Article 6, it is evident 
how its provisions do not apply to “expulsion cases” (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 38). Continued 
in the text, Council of Europe (2000) explains that “/t/his is because the right to protection from 
expulsion is seen not as a civil right but as an act of public authorities governed by public law” (p. 
38). Even so, Article 6 seems to be applicable in certain cases concerning asylum-seekers and 
refugees (Szewczyk, 2016, p. 59). As Szewczyk (2016) further elaborates, part where Article 6 
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comes in hand is when it comes to “removal of an alien to a particular country”, specifically, a 
removal “by expulsion or extradition decision in circumstances where the fugitive had suffered or 
risked suffering a flagrant denial of justice in the requesting country” (p. 59). Although a detailed 
definition of the phrase flagrant denial of justice has not yet been provided by the European Human 
Rights Court, Szewczyk (2016) provides examples of it, some of which being: “a trial which is 
summary in nature and conducted with a total disregard for the rights of the defence; deliberate 
and systematic refusal of access to a lawyer, especially for an individual detained in a foreign 
country” (ibid.). Subsequently, expulsion cases can be considered in relation to Article 6, only in 
the case that the applicant provides detailed evidence that he or she might face risks of the “flagrant 
denial of justice” in his or her origin country (ibid.). 
As given in the Convention, Article 8 provides the right to respect for private and family life. 
Oftentimes, Article 8 is taken together with the afore-mentioned Article 3, as a complementing 
combination in considering refugee cases. According to Council of Europe (2000), there can be a 
two-fold understanding of the Article 8 (p. 25). Aside from its main role, the protection of private 
and family life, Article 8 has an added aspect. This came about because Article 3 requires the 
“threshold of severity” test to prove the reality of a person’s circumstances (ibid.). Even if that test 
is not met, it does not mean that the person will not face “treatment which violates his right to 
respect for his ‘moral and physical integrity’” (ibid.). Knowing that Article 3 “/…/ is illimitable – 
that is, no limitation can be put on its application. It is unjustifiable – that is, no argument can be 
advanced to exculpate the offending state. It is non-derogable – that is, it is binding even in time 
of war or national emergency” (pp. 25–26), the Court had added the notion of ‘moral and physical 
integrity’ under the protection of Article 8. For instance, in the Costello-Roberts v. the United 
Kingdom case, the Court ruled that there had been a violation of Article 8, even though the case 
had previously failed the ‘threshold of severity’ test (ibid.). However, it is important to note that 
the ‘threshold of severity’ is not the only difference between Article 3 and Article 8 – there is also 
the difference in “interference” (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 26). In comparison with Article 3, 
which acts as an absolute provision, “interference with Article 8 rights /…/ can be justified under 
the second paragraph of that article. Whether or not such an interference constitutes a violation of 
Convention rights will depend on whether it is lawful, pursued a legitimate aim and is 
proportionate to the aim pursued” (ibid.). Hence, the functionality of Article 8 is sometimes 
dependent on the Court’s discretion. 
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Article 4 of Protocol no. 4 might be one of the provisions most directly referring to refugees. It 
prohibits “a collective expulsion of aliens” (European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, 
Protocol 4, Article 4). As explained by Council of Europe (2000), ‘collective expulsion’ means 
“any measure of the competent authority compelling aliens as a group to leave the country, except 
where such measure is taken after and on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of 
the particular cases of each individual alien in the group” (pp. 26–27).  
Lastly, Article 4 of Protocol no. 7 states the “right not to be tried or punished twice” (European 
Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Protocol 7, Article 4). According to Council of Europe 
(2000), this provision is applicable only if there is “trial and conviction for the same offence in the 
same jurisdiction”, but is not applied in cases “where the prosecutions take place in different 
jurisdictions” (p. 25). This Article can occasionally lead back to Article 3, “where such double 
jeopardy might constitute inhumane or degrading treatment” (ibid.). 
As stated by Council of Europe (2000), although the Convention does not directly focus on the 
asylum seekers and refugees, looking at it as an independent element in the system, the protection 
provided by the Convention is “the most important safeguard against the interests of the state 
eclipsing the human rights of individuals” (p. 55). It certainly offers important adjustments to the 
protection and safeguards for refugees and asylum-seekers that come to the European territory.  
2.1.3 The Dublin Regulation and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
The Dublin Regulation and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) were primarily 
established by the EU as ways of strengthening the regional power in eliminating issues regarding 
refugees and asylum-seekers. Moreover, Dublin Regulation specifically, has been promoting the 
well-needed “harmonization” of the EU countries’ refugee protection and asylum policies for the 
purpose of increasing ability to unitedly resolve any potential issues (Wolf, 1996, p. 227; Hatton, 
2005, p. 106). However, this idea of harmonization does not condone the fair share of the 
responsibilities, but it primarily serves the purpose of assigning “responsibility for processing an 
asylum application to a single Member State” (Radjenovic, 2019). 
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Initially, the first formulation of the Dublin Regulation was created in 1990, following the 
development of the Schengen system7, and it came into force in 1997, becoming the administrating 
document of the European asylum law. With the ‘elimination of borders’, there was a need to 
protect refugees, asylum-seekers, and the EU (Schengen) host countries as well. For instance, the 
dissolution of the Russian Federation and the collapse of the former Yugoslavia had created an 
almost decade-long influx of refugees from the Balkan region toward the Western countries, and 
raised the need for creating a more synchronized refugee protection system in Europe (Dustmann 
et al., 2017, p. 500). Therefore, the Dublin Regulation, officially titled “The Convention 
determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the 
member states” (Refugee council, 2002, p. 1), was created, stating that “an asylum claim would 
be dealt with by one state only, specifically the state of first entry” (Hatton, 2005, p. 108). Another 
reason the Dublin Regulation was established was to prevent the problem of asylum shopping, 8  
responsibility of which was put on the states of the first entry, too. (Wolf, 1996, p. 227). 
Subsequently, in London in 1992, an additional resolution was established which shaped three new 
concepts for the bettering of the Dublin Regulation (Hatton, 2005, p. 108; Facchini et al., 2006, p. 
414). The first concept is of a ‘safe third country’, which allows “refusal of admission if the refugee 
had gone through a safe third country” (ibid.); second concept being that “’manifestly unfounded' 
claims could be rejected without the right to appeal” (ibid.); and third where “a list of 'safe 
countries of origin' was drawn up, with the presumption that no serious risk would be incurred by 
the claimant were she to be expelled and repatriated to a country on that list” (ibid.). The concepts 
which allow refusal of asylum applications can eventually result in the so called “asylum orbiting” 
officially known as refugees in orbit. This means that an asylum seeker is “not returned directly to 
a country where they may be persecuted, /but/ is denied asylum or unable to find a State willing to 
examine their request, and are shuttled from one country to another in a constant search for 
asylum” (European Commission, 2016). Regardless of the efforts to create a unifying system, due 
to extremely high pressures of first entry countries, “individual governments responded to 
mounting pressures, often with a succession of policy packages” (Hatton, 2005, p. 109). In other 
                                                 
7 “The free movement of persons is a fundamental right guaranteed by the EU to its citizens. Schengen cooperation 
enhances this freedom by enabling citizens to cross internal borders without being subjected to border checks” (EC, 
2018).  
8 According to Wolf (1996), asylum shopping stands for “practice of applying for asylum in more than one country to 
increase the chance that one will be granted” (p. 227).  
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words, each country still applied its individual policies rather than comply by the newly established 
international system. That is why, “/a/ true international coordination, in the sense that policy is 
set at the EU level rather than percolating upwards from below, did not emerge until the end of the 
decade” (Hatton, 2005, p. 109).  
The original version of the Dublin Regulation was replaced by Dublin II Regulation in 2003, which 
was then, again, replaced with the current, Dublin III Regulation in 2013, which has been in force 
since January 2014 (Radjenovic, 2019). Furthermore, the Dublin III Regulation “identifies the EU 
country responsible for examining an asylum application, by using a hierarchy of criteria such as 
family unity, possession of residence documents or visas, irregular entry or stay, and visa-waived 
entry” (ibid.). Furthermore, it largely works around protecting children’s rights and the 
preservation of family life, especially in cases of separation of family members fleeing their native 
countries (Refugee Council, 2015, p. 1): “/…/ respect for family life should be a primary 
consideration of Member States when applying this Regulation” (Dublin Regulation III, 2013 
provision 14)9. Dublin III Regulation still largely protects its countries from any illicit entry, 
attempt of an entry under false pretenses and other circumstances, potentially damaging to host 
countries. At the same time, the Dublin III Regulation provides detailed informing on asylum 
seekers’ rights, protection and fair treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers, as it is stated in 
Article 4 (right to information): “/host country’s/ competent authorities shall inform the applicant 
of the application of this Regulation”, which includes “the objectives of this Regulation” (ibid.), 
“the criteria for determining the Member State responsible” (ibid.), and “the possibility to 
challenge a transfer decision” (ibid.). However, the implementation of the Dublin III Regulation 
is somewhat challenging. For instance, in theory, every asylum seeker has the option of and the 
access to the process of applying for asylum in a desired country while fleeing. Unfortunately, in 
practice, very few individuals have the access to the asylum application process, one of the reasons 
being high level of bureaucratization of processes, where the process of application is overly 
complex, so the rights of refugees and asylum seekers are deteriorated (Radjenovic, 2019).  Hence, 
there have recently been calls for the Dublin IV Regulation, in order to revise the existing 
procedures, and potentially make them more accessible for the asylum-seeking individuals. 
                                                 
9 Regulation (EU) no 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria 
and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast). 
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Consequently, the European Parliament (EP) proposed that the main elements revised be: an 
“automated system to monitor the number of asylum applications received and the number of 
persons effectively resettled” (Radjenovic, 2019); second, “a reference key to determine when a 
Member State is under disproportionate asylum pressure” (ibid.); and “a fairness mechanism to 
address and alleviate that pressure” (ibid.).  
In the efforts to ensure a high level of harmonization among the EU countries and their refugee 
and asylum policies, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was established. As the 
asylum activities are not a constant phenomenon, the countries have worked to create a functional 
system which would minimize the negative effects of asylum oscillations both for the host 
countries, and the asylum seekers. It would also reduce a secondary movement of asylum seekers 
and asylum shopping10 (Gallagher, 2002, p. 378; EASO, 2016, p. 13). This also means that the 
CEAS functions primary as an extension to the Dublin III Regulation, ensuring evenly distributed 
responsibilities and upkeep of minimum standards among the Member States when it comes to 
asylum (Ippolito and Velluti, 2011, p. 29; European Commission, 2018). 
Prior to the establishment of the CEAS, Member States, as signatories to the 1951 Convention and 
its 1967 Protocol, have significantly adjusted their national asylum legislative measures, fulfilling 
their obligations (EASO, 2016, p. 14). In comparison to the 1951 Convention, the CEAS was 
imagined to have a much wider scope, “/regulating/ all facets of asylum” (ibid.), comprising 
primary EU law and secondary legislation, including two EU Regulations (Dublin III Regulation 
and EURODAC Regulation11) and various Directives (ibid.). Additionally, the idea of the role of 
CEAS mainly revolved around two fundamental concepts of “fairness” and “solidarity” (Perusel, 
2015, p. 124). In this sense, “fairness” entails high level of uniformity when it comes to decision-
making relating to asylum requests, providing same opportunities for asylum seekers across the 
EU (ibid.). The other key concept, “solidarity”, regards to the need for equal burden-sharing among 
the EU Member States, especially to alleviate the burdens from the countries with overwhelming 
number of asylum applications (ibid.). From another point of view, the CEAS was created as a 
                                                 
10Asylum shopping is “the phenomenon where a third-country national applies for international protection in more 
than one EU Member State with or without having already received international protection in one of those EU 
Member States” (European Commission, 2018). 
11 “Biometric database which Member States are required to enter the fingerprint data of asylum-seekers in order to 
identify where they entered the EU. Established in 2000 and reviewed in 2013, its main purpose is to facilitate the 
application of the Dublin Regulation” (Orav, 2017). 
27 
 
supranational entity which would, with proper implementation among the EU countries, gradually 
overcome the existing national legislations regarding asylum and refugee policies, thus decreasing 
the policy discrepancies among the Member States (Brekke and Brochmann, 2015, p. 147). 
In general, the CEAS was far more successful “than most academics predicted in the late 1990s” 
(ibid.). The official 2008 evaluation of CEAS Directives assessed how “countries that started at 
lower levels had improved and those that started at higher levels had maintained above-minimum 
standards” (ibid.). However, at a deeper level, CEAS has been struggling to effectively achieve a 
significant improvement in the asylum system among the Member States, as the idea of full 
harmonization has yet to be fully accepted by all of the participating states, mostly in terms of 
states overcoming their commitment “to their national welfare regimes” (Brekke and Brochmann, 
2015, p. 160), which leads to them refraining “from any real attempts at harmonization” (ibid.). 
It seems as if many of the challenges that the 1951 Geneva Convention faces, which is considered 
a universal regime for refugee protection, are mirrored on the regional levels, specifically the EU 
and Europe. Each of the regional regimes had been established with a different goal in mind, 
whether that was harmonization or mutual protection of both refugees and the host states. Even so, 
issues seem to be rather related across the board. The most prominent problem seen is the lack of 
willingness of individual states to oblige by the principles and rules of the said regimes, which is 
directly translated into the problem of burden-sharing among the states. There have been repeated 
instances in which certain signatory or Member States neglect their obligations to the regime, and 
decide to protect their own interests, which further disrupts the dynamic of the whole system, upon 
which it was built in the first place. And even if the country accepts its responsibilities that come 
with agreeing to certain regimes, complying with provisions given in the documents becomes the 
problem. The uneven distribution of burdens certainly happens for various reasons – lack of 
financial capabilities, lack of responsible organizations, but most importantly, they largely happen 
because of the lack of political will to put individual state interests at risk in order to contribute to 
collective resolution. Most of the time, it is the refugees and the migrants that then become the 
victims of the system, hence unable to participate in admission processes normally. These issues 
seem to be the most emphasized when it comes to implementing theory into practice. Other 
challenges are loopholes in the regimes which then are misused by the refugees, or simply a lack 
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of practical applicability for some portions of the regimes, which will be assessed in the final 
analytical portion of this paper.   
 
2.2 complexity of overlapping regimes 
With the appearance of new refugee migration trends and phenomena, the need for multiple 
international refugee protection regimes emerged, as regional entities wanted to additionally 
protect their territories and nations from great flows of refugees. With the 1951 Geneva 
Convention being the very basis of the international refugee protection regime, more recent 
regimes either overlap or exist parallel with the regimes already in power (Bretts, 2009, p. 53). 
Even though multiple regimes are, in theory, created in order to complement each other and 
strengthen the overall refugee protection system, the reality becomes that some are “potentially 
competitive and contradictory” (ibid.). What is more, a higher number of such regimes also means 
the increase in the number or relevant actors, rules and agreements, amplifying the complexity of 
international refugee protection regimes and agreements (Alter and Meunier, 2009, p. 13). The 
complexity, however, is not always bound to have negative results, as remarked by Bretts (2009): 
“These new institutions /…/ have offered states a range of new instruments through which they 
can meet their interests in relation to the movement of people fleeing persecution /…/” (p. 53). 
They have, besides founding new mechanisms, altered the functioning of international refugee 
protection regimes and the roles of the most influential entities in this aspect (Betts, 2009, p. 53; 
Alter and Meunier, 2009, p. 13). Overall, the changes that have been brought about by the 
transforming landscape of refugee protection are crucial in the understanding of the functioning 
and decision-making among governments when it comes to refugee protection.  
Thus, the importance of this analysis lies in emphasizing the challenges that are created by such 
high complexity of multilayered existence of global and regional refugee and asylum seekers’ 
protection regimes. Oftentimes, there are noticeable discrepancies between theoretical and 
practical application of certain regimes and agreements, which further present significant 
hindrances in regimes’ effective implementation.  
Due to the dynamicity of simultaneous existence of multiple refugee protection regimes, the 
discrepancies in their functionality happen for different reasons. While for some, the main 
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problems are in the mutual contradictions of two or more systems, others battle with keeping up 
with the increasingly fast-changing nature of different international phenomena. Not to forget, the 
multi-layered system of regimes makes it rather challenging for the actors to be able to follow 
through with all, hence oftentimes are forced to choose – resulting in choices that agree best with 
individual interests and self-protection. The reality is that, most of the time, major issues arise 
from a combination of all these reasons listed above.  
In her work, Hurwitz (2012) notes that the overlapping regimes can create so called “protection 
gaps” in refugee regimes, offering opportunities for free-riding and unequal burden-sharing (p. 
430). This issue not only means that the concepts of fairness and solidarity are rather disregarded, 
but the refugees suffer as well by not receiving proper protection by the international community 
(ibid.); because participating states are not able to prioritize their obligations established through 
multiple layers of regimes, thus they opt for simply not fulfilling certain obligations at all. Even 
with the harmonization instruments such as the CEAS itself, the multiplicity of international 
refugee protection regimes seems to have a much larger toll on the system than it would have been 
anticipated. According to Havlova and Tamchynova (2016), some Member States continue to 
attract refugees to “different degrees /…/ due to the varieties in their economic development, 
cultural, religious and ethnic structure, and national legal systems” (p. 87), which only adds to the 
problem. The fact that, while the established regimes have universal standards that apply to all 
participating states, in reality, every state has different level of capabilities and abilities to 
contribute to the regime. The ‘protection gaps’, especially when it comes to a larger refugee influx, 
allow for many states to avoid their refugee protection responsibilities, encouraging an unequal 
share of burden to be distributed among the countries (Hurwitz, 2012, p. 431; Havlova and 
Tamchynova, 2016, p. 87).  As it will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 4, in times of crisis, 
individual state interests most often trump the need for collective action, transferring the burden 
only to most capable states. This leads to several issues, one of which is an increased risk of refugee 
lives not being protected by the international community, regardless of the fact that the 
international regimes bind them to do so (Havlova and Tamchynova, 2016, p. 87). Another issue 
is that unequal share of responsibility means that, states which take over a larger number of 
refugees, will potentially suffer economic and social consequences due to an increased influx of 
refugees and asylum seekers (Havlova and Tamchynova, 2016, p. 90). The existing discrepancies 
are, as it can be seen, hurting both the international community (more specifically, a number of 
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individual states) and refugees and asylum seekers. Despite the efforts that have been put forward 
in order to effectively harmonize overlapping refugee protection regimes, their success still largely 
depends on states’ willingness to adjust. Due to the technical nature of refugee protection regimes, 
individual actors are able to use those technicalities in order to work to their own advantage. For 
instance, the 1951 Geneva Convention obligates states to protect refugees only once they enter 
their territories. Consequently, “if they can find alternative ways to avoid refugees reaching their 
territory then they can avoid these legal obligations” (Betts, 2009, p. 54). Moreover, when it comes 
to complexity of international regimes, their power is distributed rather hierarchically. As a result, 
it is possible for one entity to override another, intentionally or unintentionally, influencing the 
interactions and compliance of individual actors involved in the process (Alter and Meunier, 2009, 
p. 13). Further in their work, Alter and Meunier (2009) focus on the fact that the existence of 
overlapping regimes clouds rational thinking and “leads to selective information processing”, 
which ultimately results in unintended and rather negative consequences, since the cause-and-
effect relationships became unclear (p. 17). The complexity of international refugee protection 
regimes, when it comes to effective decision-making and issue resolution, decreases the uniform 
operation of all involved actors, whereas at the same time, creates opportunities for free-riding and 
unequal burden-sharing. 
As the reviewed literature suggests, problems regarding insufficient collective action regarding the 
refugee crisis are diverse. In regime theory, the main notion focuses on the power of regimes, 
whether international, regional or any other kind for that matter, to influence and guide the 
behavior and decision-making among the participating states. Subsequently, the power and 
authority of established regimes should be acknowledged and respected. But, as it will be further 
discussed later in this research, the idea of a complete compliance with international refugee 
protection regimes only remains possible in theory. While all the reasons listed above are a part of 
the problem, the key issue, which enables other series of problems to follow seems to be 
prioritization of individual interests. Oftentimes, states blur the line between security of the state 
and mere political unwillingness to participate in collective action, both of which result in the same 
thing – avoidance of obligations under different regimes, and unequal burden-sharing. Most of the 
regimes, aside from resolving political and other issues, are made to encourage and, ultimately, 
ensure fair burden-sharing among the participating states. The emphasis is, as said, put on the 
power of collective approach to resolving an issue, rather than individual action. Therefore, when 
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the joint action falls through, other above-mentioned issues follow suit, creating a vicious circle of 
problems that prolong the crisis, and deepen long-term consequences for all participating states. 
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3 2015 REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
 
The Arab Spring 2010-2011 caught on very quickly among the countries in the region. Comprising 
two continents, Africa and Asia, it caused a series of uprisings and unrests with grave 
consequences. Although the revolutions happened simultaneously, each had a different reason – 
from political oppression to economic factors, majority of which have resulted in overthrows of 
their governments, and drastic reforms (Doomen, 2013, p. 400). The result of these series of events 
was, as it was mentioned previously in the text, the greatest refugee crisis since World War II. 
Now, with eighth year of crisis in the region, “5.6 million /Syrians only/ have been forced to take 
refuge in neighboring countries” (European Commission, 2018). The crisis quickly became a 
historic humanitarian crisis that has been witnessed by the international community.  
Once the crisis had reached its peak in 2015- 2016, the European Union Member States and 
European countries have face one of the greatest challenges in the continent’s recent history – 
quick and effective care of the immigrants who had been reaching European territory in 
unprecedented numbers. The refugee crisis was a perfect opportunity for the EU to showcase its 
power and systematic capabilities as an international entity. The process of resolving the refugee 
crisis certainly revealed a range of flaws and failures, which, for many experts, brought into 
question the actual effectiveness of the European Union. What is more, not only the institutional 
power of the European Union was at stake, but the harmonization and the power of its Member 
States to overcome their political and ideological interests for the greater good, which was 
resolving the ongoing crisis.  
For the reasons listed above, this chapter will discuss and analyze the history of the refugee crisis, 
and the fundamental challenges that have arisen globally and regionally in the EU, and the 
European community beyond the borders of the EU because of the mentioned refugee crisis. It 
will attempt to create understanding and context for the role of international refugee protection 
regimes, certain processes and decisions made related to them, which have ultimately impacted 
the direction in which the 2015 refugee crisis was addressed. This chapter will look at the issues 
related to the obligations of the international refugee protection regimes, and the way that burden-
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sharing under those obligations and prevailing protection of self-interests altogether influenced the 
refugee crisis. 
 
3.1 History behind the crisis 
According to Ferris and Kirişci (2016), the “refugee crisis is just the latest of a long series of large-
scale displacements of people in the Middle East over many centuries” (p. 8). The history of the 
region certainly offers much of the context necessary to understand the intensity and the nature of 
refugee flows coming to Europe, mostly from the Middle East.  
The uprisings across the Middle East had begun at the end of 2010 and the start of 2011. As 
explained by Haas and Lesch (2013), the Arab Spring was “characterized in the beginning by huge 
and largely peaceful popular protests in a number of Arab countries” (p. 1), which is why many 
researchers emphasize the surprise effect that the later intensity of the movement had on almost 
everyone. The Arab Spring has resulted in the overthrow of the governments of Egypt, Libya, 
Tunisia, and Yemen and has led to the implementation of important reforms both there and 
elsewhere” (Doomen, 2013, p. 400). Overall, the movement has affected “Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, 
Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Bahrain to a greater extent, /had/ minor effects on Morocco, Jordan” 
(Asfandyar and Ullah, 2018, p. 1). The moment that had started it all was a young vendor’s protest 
against the government in Tunisia, where he set himself on fire (Haas and Lesch, 2013, p. 1). His 
protest eventually led to an overthrow of the Tunisian president, Zine El Abidine. Similarly, 
Egyptians spent some time in Cairo’s central square protesting, which also led to Husni Mubarak’s 
impeachment (Haas and Lesch, 2013). The chain reaction of protests throughout the region, which 
had inspired one another, had been happening at a relatively fast rate. After Egypt and Tunisia, 
Yemen witnessed similar events – there, President Ali Abdullah Saleh escaped from Yemen in 
June 2011 in response to widespread pressure (Haas and Lesch, 2013). The protests spread very 
fast in the region, becoming increasingly alarming for the international political world. Before the 
final culmination, the Arab Spring led to the death of Muammar al-Gadafi, a Libyan President, as 
a result of resistance which was “supported militarily by NATO and the Arab League” (ibid.). 
In spite of the seeming collectivity of the protests, the reasons behind the uprisings, as stated by 
Doomen (2013), “are multifaceted” (p. 400), “varying from political factors such as oppression 
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/…/ and corruption /…/ and the lack of legitimacy and accountability /…/ to economic 
determinants /…/, and even the presence of natural resources plays a role” (ibid.). On the contrary 
to Doomen, Ghanem (2016) argues that the focal point of the Arab Spring are solely economic 
factors, adding that “/l/imited economic opportunities and increasing inequality were key drivers 
of the Arab Spring” (p. 39).  
Additionally, Haas and Lesch (2013) share a rather impactful factor of the protests – “the states in 
North Africa and the Middle East have more ‘youth bulges’ – which are a disproportionate number 
of young people in a particular state” (p. 3). In the countries where the uprisings were most 
prominent, almost half of the protesting population were people below the age of 25. For instance, 
in Tunisia, over 42% of the population was younger than 25, 48% in Libya, 51% in Egypt and 
57% in Syria (ibid.). Generally, young bulges have a much higher tendency to actually act on their 
dissatisfactions and problems, which then often leads to disruption of social and political 
environments (ibid.). Thus, a combination of demographic and psychographic factors can be seen 
as reasons and causes behind the unexpectedly violent Arab Spring.  
It is important to note, however, that each of the countries’ political, socio-economic or any other 
circumstance happened as individual events, which eventually resulted in a rather collective 
movement of people across different regions. Even though the reasons listed above seem to be 
pinpointing poor economic situations, the economies of the Middle East and North Africa were, 
in fact, growing, so the Arab revolutions of 2010–11 took everybody by surprise (Haas and Lesch, 
2013, p. 2). Consequently, the prevalently economic dissatisfaction grew into socially and 
politically driven uprisings, creating all-encompassing events across the two continents.   
Finally, the uprisings which were the part of the above-mentioned Arab Spring have “inspired 
protests in Syria” (Al Rifai, 2017). Syrian regime had seemed stronger than the mass protests at 
first. However, the regime had responded with “a brutal crackdown against the opposition” (Haas 
and Lesch, 2013, p. 1), which was an announcement of its near fall.  Soon after, the country 
witnessed a start of a brutal civil war in May 2011 (ibid.). 
The multi-layered nature of the Arab Spring has largely influenced the movements of the people 
around the region, for economic and, more importantly, safety reasons. In 2013, the continuous 
unrest and civil wars in the region of the Middle East has resulted in an unusually high inflow of 
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refugees to Europe and EU specifically. Escaping to save their lives, millions of refugees fled 
mostly from Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia (van Prooijen et al., 2017, p. 1), focus being on the 
Syrian civil war (Fullerton, 2017, p. 48). As the largest portion of the fleeing population from the 
region, Syrian refugees began to cross the Mediterranean in order to reach Europe and seek refuge 
there. In 2015, the number of incoming displaced persons had peaked, causing one of the greatest 
refugee crises on the EU territory since World War II (van Prooijen et al., 2017, p. 1; Hafez, 2015).  
The reason why the true magnitude of the crisis was neither predicted nor anticipated is because it 
had been commonly assumed “that any displacement caused by popular uprisings in Syria would 
be of a very temporary nature” (Ferris and Kirişci, 2016, p. 33). 
 
3.2 Migration movements: upcoming crisis in Europe 
The escalation of unrests, conflicts and repression in the affected countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa have led to large numbers of both internally and externally displaced people. As it 
was mentioned previously, initial migration was mostly directed to all the neighboring countries, 
such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Due to “the brutal treatment of civilians by the Islamic State 
in Iraq” (Ferris and Kirişci, 2016, p. 34), Iraq was only producing additional refugees who were 
moving toward the same host countries as those migrants from Syria. These migration trends have 
put immense strain on the neighboring host countries, as they have struggled to keep up with the 
incoming waves of immigrants fleeing from their home countries. As noted by Ferris and Kirişci 
(2016), “/t/he registered refugee populations in Lebanon and Jordan have by and large remained 
stable at around 630,000 since early 2014 in Jordan and around 1.1 million since late 2014 in 
Lebanon, the results of hardening border policies in both countries” (p. 34).  
After the situations had settled in the some of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, a 
portion of the migration had navigated there, which means that the focal point of the refugee 
movements has become the Syrian refugees. There, “/t/he conflict has been transformed from a 
rebellion against an oppressive regime into a sectarian civil war” (Ferris and Kirişci, 2016, p. 17). 
In addition, many foreign states have used the opportunity to lead multiple proxy wars in Syria as 
well. The already problematic and highly complex conflict in Syria has only become more 
complicated with an involvement from all sides – from Russia all the way to the United States 
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(ibid.). With so many proxy wars and the radical groups that have emerged in the process, Syria’s 
future as a country and a nation-state is highly questionable. Such perilous conditions in the 
country have produced extremely high numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 
refugees, who fled Syria in the hopes to find safety elsewhere.  
As a result, in 2016, there had been around “245,000 and 117,000 registered Syrian refugees /…/ 
in Iraq and Egypt, respectively, together with another estimated 28,000 refugees in North African 
countries” (Ferris and Kirişci, 2016, p. 35). Even though the majority of the refugees were Sunnis, 
other affected groups were “Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds, Roma, and Yazidis” (ibid.). To 
compare, in 2018, the numbers of IDPs in Syria rose to 6.6 million, and over 5.6 million registered 
refugees (UNHCR, 2018). 
As already mentioned, the initial flows of refugees from Syria, Iraq and other affected countries 
were to the neighboring countries, most strain of which have experienced Lebanon, Jordan and 
Turkey. These migration trends have roots in, aside from the political unrests in the native 
countries, “pre-existing ties and regional labor migration” (Doraï, 2018, p. 113). Although most of 
the host countries in the Middle East are not signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention, 
“/b/ilateral agreements existed to facilitate the circulation and employment – with restrictions – of 
people” (ibid.). Moreover, the same countries have established open door policies in the start of 
the conflict in Syria, providing the refugees with a nearby opportunity for settlement (ibid.). 
Among other reasons, this open-door policy could be a cause for such intense and fast overflow of 
refugees in the neighboring countries. Consequently, “/m/igration policies of neighboring states 
have dramatically changed since 2011” - “Lebanon suspended a bilateral agreement in 2014” 
regarding the access to the labor market for Syrian refugees (Doraï, 2018, pp. 115–116). 
Regardless, great number of refugees had still been entering the country, which called for more 
restrictions. Now, “very few Syrian refugees are allowed to enter” (ibid.).  
First refugees had arrived to Turkey in 2011. Similar to Lebanon and other neighboring countries, 
Turkey had also introduced the open-door policy initially (Ferris and Kirişci, 2016). In the 
beginning, it had no issue with offering temporary housing to the incoming refugees. With growing 
numbers of people coming into the country, there was a need for additional housing units. To keep 
up with the overflow of migrants, “the Disaster and Emergency Management Agency was given 
the task of constructing purpose-built camps for refugees” (Ferris and Kirişci, 2016, p. 53). 
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Throughout this process, there had been over 200,000 refugees settled in camps across Turkey in 
less than two years. However, “more and more refugees arrived and preferred to live in urban 
settings” (ibid.), which necessitated the involvement of more institutions to ensure some protection 
for the refugees, such as the Directorate General for Migration Management, which “took over the 
task of registration and overall coordination” (ibid.). By creating more safe space for the refugees, 
Turkey had over 2.5 million registered refugees by the end of 2015.  
This gradual closing of the borders in the neighboring countries only forced the new waves of 
refugees to seek help somewhere else. Subsequently, the flow of refugees continued to move 
northwest, which means it shifted to the Mediterranean and the countries of Europe, more 
precisely, the EU. As a result of the flow shift, there were two main route choices toward Europe 
– through Turkey, or, more dangerous route, over the Mediterranean. The main entrance points of 
those routes can be seen below in Figure 3.1 Refugees fleeing over the Mediterranean by boats 
entered Europe mainly through Italy, Greece and Spain, countries through which the refugees 
would reach the rest of the Europe (Reuters, 2015). Whereas the route passing through Turkey led 
the migrant flows directly toward and through the Balkans.  
Figure 3.1: Migrant entrance points to Europe through the Mediterranean routes 
 
Source: Reuters, 2015. 
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The route over the Mediterranean Sea has claimed many lives throughout the years of the crisis: 
“the 2018 death toll and the drowning deaths of at least 17,589 people on the Mediterranean since 
2014” (Clarke, 2019, p. 14). The Eastern and Central Mediterranean Routes have been the most 
popular among the refugees, especially when it comes to irregular entrance to the European 
territory. As visible in Figure 3.1, Italy and Greece are the most popular entrance points through 
those routes. Most of the refugees are Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans (Frontex, 2018). Up to the first 
half of 2016, Greece had been receiving significantly more refugees than other entry points in 
Europe. However, after the EU-Turkey Deal, the number of incoming refugees to Greece fell 
remarkably, but it was not really eliminated. With little choice of migratory routes to Europe, the 
migration influx previously coming to Greece had only reallocated to Italy, which put a great strain 
on its resources and capabilities. According to International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
report from 2016, “Greece and Italy alone account/ed/ for 92.9% of the 366,350 arrivals” (2016, 
p. 1). As mentioned, in the aftermath of the EU-Turkey deal, there was “a definite increase of 16% 
(or 24,897 more individuals)” (IOM, 2016, p. 2), while simultaneously, “Greece has seen an 80% 
decrease in new arrivals” (ibid.). This shift is shown in the Figure 3.2, depicting the shift in the 
inflows of migrants to Italy and Greece through the Eastern Mediterranean Route.  
Figure 3.2: Average daily arrivals of refugees to Greece and Italy in 2016 
 
Source: International Organization for Migration – IOM, 2016. 
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After the Mediterranean Routes, the next most popular route continuing onto the Eastern 
Mediterranean Route, on the way to the rest of the Europe are Western Balkans. It is one of the 
fastest routes for the refugees to enter the rest of the European Union and seek asylum in more 
appealing Member States. Aside from that, the migrants were forced to take that route since 
Hungary had closed off its border to any incoming refugees, hence limiting the scope of movement 
through the southeastern parts of Europe. During the peak of the refugee crisis, 2015-2016, the 
refugee influx into and through Western Balkans Route was immense. Additionally, the popularity 
of refugee smuggling and human trafficking spiked during those years, counting around 764 
thousand illegal entrances just in 2015 through the Western Balkans Route (Frontex, 2018). Since 
the only Member States directly on the route were Croatia and Slovenia, the regulation of the 
migration influx was vague. Additionally, the countries on the route claimed lack of capacities, 
which resulted in ‘forwarding’ of the refugees toward the north, especially Germany: “in the 
autumn of 2015, Croatia did not consistently fingerprint refugees passing its territory as it was 
envisioned in the EURODAC Regulation, but helped them get through Croatia towards Slovenia 
and Austria and then towards Germany” (Sardelic, 2017). The number of migrants moving toward 
Germany was especially high almost throughout the whole duration of the refugee crisis because 
“Germany suspended the Dublin Regulation in the case of Syrian refugees in late August 2015 and 
temporarily opened its borders for asylum-seekers staying in Hungary (Zaun, 2018, p. 50), in 
addition to having an “open arms” policy for the migrants. The issue of smuggling and unlawful 
forwarding of the refugees was minimized in 2016, after the establishment of the EU-Turkey Deal. 
Interestingly, in 2018, two years post-deal, there had been a repeated increase in migrant 
movements through the region. According to a 2019 IOM Report on migration flows, “/b/etween 
January and December 2018, a total of 61,0121 irregular migrants were officially registered by the 
authorities in the Western Balkan countries which is five times more than the 13,216 registered in 
the previous year” (p. 1). Heightened border controls in the countries of the initial Western Balkans 
Route led to change in transit routes, which are now largely going through “Albania and 
Montenegro, countries that were not affected by the migratory flows in 2016” (IOM, 2019, p. 1). 
Nevertheless, even with the change in transit routes, the overall increase in the number of irregular 
migrants in Western Balkans has been rather significant compared to the period immediately post-
EU-Turkey Deal, which can be seen in Figure 3.3 below. 
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Figure 3.3: Irregular migration throughout the Western Balkans route in 2017 and 2018 
 
Source: International Organization for Migration, 2019. 
 
Seeing that the Dublin Regulation III has not managed to create a more harmonized asylum system, 
in fall 2015, at the height of the refugee crisis, the European Commission proposed an update to 
the existing Dublin Regulation III, focusing especially on the idea to implement permanent 
relocation quota system (Zaun, 2018, p. 44), instead of putting all of the strain on the countries of 
first entry. This idea was unsuccessful, and ultimately substituted with “much less integrative 
mechanisms have been under discussion since May 2016” (ibid.), such as “the idea of ‘flexible 
solidarity’ promoted by the Visegrad countries” (ibid.), which means that receiving refugees would 
be solely voluntary, where the countries refraining from receiving refugees would contribute 
financially and with expertise (ibid.). Having such opposition to proposal of permanent quota 
system would mean for many of the countries, which showed as less willing to share the burden 
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of high refugee inflows, that they would have to comply and deal with migrants despite their 
unwillingness to do so. Throughout September 2015, the EU states have been attempting to reach 
an agreement regarding issues like relocation quotas, mechanisms and distribution of refugees 
among the states (Lovec, 2017, p. 136). However, due to an already expressed disagreement among 
the states, there had come to a rather bipolar decision-making. While the Visegrad countries 
strongly opposed the idea of established relocation quotas in general, especially those based on an 
‘objective key’12, Germany and Austria used their qualified majority voting, as to overpower the 
“troublemakers” (ibid.). This is just another demonstration of the states’ inability and 
unwillingness to function as a unified body in times when collective action becomes the most 
viable option for crisis resolution. Other than European Commission and the Parliament, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is “is crucial to the content of European law on 
immigration and asylum” (Labayle and De Bruycker, 2012, p. 4). ECtHR is very significant when 
it comes to the protection of asylum, although it is a right not recognized in the European 
Convention on Human Rights on the basis of Article 3 (ibid.). Nevertheless, the European Court 
of Human Rights has been fundamental in shaping the asylum in Europe, providing detailed 
interpretations of rights and provisions in asylum systems, hence controlling the departures of 
Member States from their obligations in the asylum system (ibid.). For example, the European 
Court of Human Rights has had “a decisive role in protecting the fundamental rights of aliens 
facing expulsion from the territory by developing a number of guarantees to their advantage” 
(Labayle and De Bruycker, 2012, p. 5). The first guarantees are essential, which means that they 
present a hindrance when it comes to an “expulsion of an alien”, specifically regarding Articles 3 
and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ibid.). This being said, it can be seen how 
substantial the role of the European Court of Human Rights is when it comes to giving asylum an 
additional level of security, especially when it comes to reiterating the notion of the non-
refoulement rule. 
Since the beginning of the arrival of refugees to Europe, the number of refugees counts a little 
below 2 million people, with around 18 thousand dead and missing people mostly on the 
Mediterranean Routes (UNHCR, 2019). With the arrival of the refugees, it became apparent that 
they not only sought asylum, but their arrival meant humanitarian crisis of an unseen extent. So 
                                                 
12 Objective key consisted of “total population (40%), GDP (40%), unemployment rate (10%) and existing efforts 
(10%) (Lovec, 2017, p. 134). 
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far, the EU has put over 10.6 billion euros into humanitarian assistance within and outside of EU 
(European Commission, 2018). Although the humanitarian assistance from Europe has been 
tremendous, it seems as if it was not sufficient to fully address the problems that came with the 
refugee crisis. Majority of the decision-making processes had to be fast and effective, most often 
short-term in nature, additionally eliminating the possiblity of trial-and-error period as to find the 
most feasible solutions. Consequently, while some of the decisions made yielded very positive 
results, others are still in place with rather detrimental long-term consequences, one such decision 
being the EU-Turkey Deal.  
3.2.1 EU-Turkey deal: A safe bet or a risky alliance? 
As announced previously in the analysis, neighboring countries of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey 
have relatively quickly filled their capacities for receiving refugees. Their once open-door policies 
gradually became more restrictive, as the numbers of refugees mostly coming from Syria, have 
growing rapidly and unpredictably. In the light of such circumstances, the refugees continued to 
move northwest toward Europe. European countries were overcome with the inflow of refugees 
and were quickly becoming more and more restrictive. In 2015, the refugee crisis has peaked in 
Europe with over 1 million people seeking refuge. Consequently, in October 2015, the EU and 
Turkey established the so-called ‘deal’ about resolving the refugee crisis. More precisely, they 
have established a Joint Action Plan (JAP) to collectively address the overwhelming numbers of 
refugees.  
According to the deal, the EU had to pay “substantial and concrete funds to ease the financial 
burden on Turkey relating to refugee accommodation” (Schoenhuber, 2018, p. 655). As for 
Turkey, its obligation was to “strengthen its efforts in restricting migrants moving from Turkey to 
EU territory and, in addition, readmit all irregular migrants who entered EU territory through 
Turkey and were subsequently determined to not require international protection” (ibid.). This 
initial plan to decrease the large number of incoming refugees to Europe failed.  
Hence, in the midst of the sense of panic that had been spread across the region, the EU had decided 
to establish another, potentially much more effective plan in order to resolve the issue of irregular 
refugee arrivals to EU territory. The result of this decision was the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, an 
agreement finalized in March 2016. The main purpose of this agreement was “to discourage 
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migrants from trying to enter EU territory on the dangerous sea route” (Schoenhuber, 2018, p. 
655). The official document consisted of a number of provisions directly regarding the refugees 
incoming from Syria. Most relevant provisions state (Schoenhuber, 2018, pp. 655–656): 
1) All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March, 2016 
will be returned to Turkey. This will take place in full accordance with EU and international law, 
thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion. All migrants will be protected in accordance with 
the relevant international standards and in respect of the principle of non-refoulement . . . Migrants 
not applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or inadmissible in 
accordance with the said directive will be returned to Turkey /…/ 
2) For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled 
from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria /…/. 
5) The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all participating 
Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the 
end of June 2016, provided that all benchmarks have been met /…/. 
 
As it can be seen, the agreement addresses not only the influx of refugees, but illegal immigrants 
as well, mostly smuggled refugees coming from Turkey through the sea route (ibid.). The most 
important aspect of this agreement is for EU to decrease the number of unregulated migrants 
coming through the Aegean Sea route and entering the EU territory to the Greek islands (ibid.). 
This agreement was intended to fully be put into force in October 2017. However, by that time, 
only some of the provisions were adaptive – this resulted in that “only the citizens of third country 
states with which Turkey has concluded bilateral treaties or arrangements on readmission could be 
subject to the readmission obligations” (Lehner, 2018, p. 3). EU’s attempt to quickly fix the 
refugee crisis on its territory has gained a lot of attention, asking many questions about the side 
effects of this agreement; most importantly, is this agreement in violation of the international law 
regarding protection of refugees?  
In this research work, there is an extensive overview of the 1951 Geneva Convention. One of the 
most important and fundamental principles laid out in the document in the principle of non-
refoulement. The principle of non-refoulement bans any signatory state from expelling or returning 
a refugee to the states where he or she might face persecution. Violating this principle is possible 
to do, either directly or indirectly. Direct refoulement happens when a country of entry returns the 
refugee back to the country of persecution. On the other hand, indirect refoulement happens if a 
signatory state sends the refugee to another host country, “where the sending State knew or ought 
to have known that the recipient state would not properly process the application of the asylum 
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claimant or refugee, leading to a higher likelihood of a rejected application and potential 
refoulement to persecution” (Poon, 2016, p. 1196). The widespread application of this principle 
has led to it becoming a part of the customary international law, and is a fundamental principle in 
many international and regional human rights and refugee protection documents. Thus, the EU 
should be, and has repeatedly ensured the public that it is highly aware of the principle of non-
refoulement, especially in regard to the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal. 
However, it has been recognized that the Deal violates international law and the principle of non-
refoulement in multiple ways. According to Poon (2016), the most prominent problem regarding 
the Deal is that “EU presumes Turkey to be a ‘safe third country’, where it is assumed that asylum 
claimants and refugees are able to apply for international protection as guaranteed under the 
Refugee Convention from the ‘safe third country’ rule” (p. 1198). Next, as Turkey is not a Member 
State of EU, it is not obligated to act according to its laws. Subsequently, this means that 
“procedural safeguards that are in place within the EU are not applicable to Turkey, leading to 
instances where the guarantees to the right to life and prohibition against torture are denied in 
direct violation of the principle of non-refoulement in the human rights context” (ibid.). Lastly, the 
problem deepens because Turkey “does not have a good record of according asylum claimants and 
refugees proper access to asylum procedures” (ibid.), nor it has “proper domestic mechanisms in 
place to ensure substantive and procedural protections for asylum claimants and refugees” (ibid.). 
This being said, the EU-Turkey Deal does not protect the refugees that are fleeing their countries 
due to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ from refoulement, nor they are guaranteed a proper 
examination of their merits and options for further settlement and asylum (Poon, 2016, p. 1202).  
Some authors have acknowledged the success of the Deal in reducing the numbers of irregular 
refugees coming into the EU territory, but have, as Poon, raised concerns over the ethical 
connotations of this agreement. While successful on one front, McEwen (2017) states the Deal’s 
failure on the other front: “By focusing on burden-shifting and deterrence rather than focusing on 
protection, the results of the deal are a humanitarian failure” (p. 22). Moreover, the problem of 
resettlement to Turkey carries another shortfall – Turkey was already exceeding its capacities in 
settling the refugees coming from Syria and Iraq before the EU-Turkey deal, which ultimately 
resulted in “Turkey’s refugee camps fail/ing/ to provide basic human services such as clean water, 
emergency medical services, and protection from dangers such as kidnappings” (McEwen, 2017, 
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p. 23). This issue comes back to the questionable designation of Turkey as a ‘safe third country’, 
which it has repeatedly proven it was not. Furthermore, McEwen (2017) raises an important point 
regarding the refugees: “refugees fleeing from conflict-torn states like Syria can play a critical role 
in rebuilding their countries of origin after the fighting is over” (ibid.), which they can do only if 
they are “alive, healthy, /and/ educated” (ibid.).  
In the analysis of the practical effectiveness of the EU-Turkey Deal, Adam (2017) emphasizes 
how, due to the violations of the international refugee law in the Deal and on the Greek islands, “a 
number of NGOs and even UNHCR have suspended their activities on the islands in disagreement 
with the refugee deal” (p. 8). Namely, because there had been a general trend of international law 
violations within the EU throughout the crisis, Greece was left alone to deal with an ever-growing 
humanitarian crisis. The resettlement worked poorly, especially resettlement among the countries 
of the EU, which led to overcrowding of the Greek islands and poor living conditions for the 
refugees (Adam, 2017, p. 8). Furthermore, the most problematic aspect of this situation is that the 
poor treatment of the incoming refugees has even worsened since the Deal (ibid.). What is more, 
many disadvantages of the Deal have arisen since its coming into power. Mostly, the problems a 
directly related to Turkey and its treatment of the refugees. Adam (2017) mentions the importance 
of the fact that Turkey “maintains a geographical limitation on the 1951 UN Refugee Convention” 
(p. 10), which means that “only refugees originating from Europe are entitled to refugee status in 
Turkey” (ibid.). Consequently, “Syrians living in Turkey are considered “guests” with temporary 
protection status provided by the Turkish government” (ibid.). To only further the problem, the 
organization and the treatment of refugees in Turkey has revealed many shortcomings – from lack 
of basic information about the application processes, to inability to receive permanent residence 
permit, which significantly impacts the lives of the refugees in Turkey (Adam, 2017).  
While the EU and Turkey continue to praise the success of the deal in terms of the reduction of 
incoming irregular refugees to the EU territory, there is a remarkable amount of international law 
violations, as well as human rights violations, and ethical failures which came with the EU-Turkey 
Deal. The significance of this example for this research is in the institutional failure to abide by 
laws, rules and norms of the international refugee protection regimes. Seeing that the EU, in times 
of panic and seeking momentary solution to an immense crisis, decided to directly violate one of 
the most authoritative refugee protection regimes in the world, it is not surprising to see a general 
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trend of such behavior among different states and entities. This panic and desperation to find fast 
resolutions to the crisis, as Schoenhuber (2018) argues in his work, “shifted the balance of power 
between the EU and Turkey because the EU was caught in a moment of weakness, of which 
Turkish leadership took advantage” (p. 649).  Hence, there is a question of the role of international 
refugee protection regimes, and their authority over particular interests.  
In this Chapter, the roles that different actors had taken on in the light of the refugee crisis could 
be seen. The true magnitude of the crisis has taken everyone by surprise, which had a very strong 
effect on the decision-making processes, and the timeliness of resolving even the simplest 
problems. Ultimately, it drastically decreased the effectiveness of existing refugee protection 
regimes, and the crisis resolution process. As it was already mentioned, the multi-layered and 
overlapping nature of the existing refugee protection regimes did not strengthen the refugee 
protection systems, but it weakened them. While some states were overwhelmed by the 
responsibilities that had fallen upon them (e.g. Greece), other states took advantage of that same 
regime complexity and absence of consequences, avoiding their obligations under those regimes. 
As it will be discussed in the next Chapter, implementation of international regimes has been 
applied only partially, but it was mostly adjusted to the individual interests of states and 
institutions. Unfortunately, the results of the delayed, panicked and disorderly decision-making 
were detrimental – many of the refugees have been stuck in between territories unable to apply for 
asylum nor seek a more permanent solution for settlement, or have been lacking basic care such 
as health care or education, which are provided in the documents for refugee protection. Certainly, 
the unwillingness to comply by the international refugee protection regimes has greatly impacted 
the direction in which the crisis has developed, from unprecedented political alliances, through 
direct violations of international law, to the changed migration patterns, straining capacities of 
only isolated states in the European territory. This behavior raises rather concerning points; besides 
the rather unbalanced effectiveness of the international refugee protection regimes, there is a lack 
of solidarity among the countries, and the question of its influence on the system and order of 
multiple international and regional institutions. With that said, it is necessary to consider and 
analyze the meaning of these discrepancies for the future of the international system as we know 
it. 
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4 (IN)EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION REGIMES  
 
In the previous chapters, analysis done has focused on international refugee protection regimes on 
different levels – beginning with the most comprising regime, the 1951 Geneva Convention, and 
coming to those more specific to regional cooperation, such as the Dublin Convention III, or the 
ECHR.  
When it comes to international refugee protection regime, the role of such systems is complex. 
Firstly, as it was noted with the 1951 Geneva Convention, the scope and the extent of the work of 
such an all-comprising regime necessitates constant changes and fast adaptation capabilities. Its 
abilities to properly address and effectively resolve possible crisis are critical to its signatory states. 
Secondly, the level of authority of the 1951 Geneva Convention is considered to be the highest 
possible in the global system of refugee protection regimes. Authority of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, in theory, lies in its long tradition and its contribution to international customary law. 
Therefore, its signatory states, as well as other regimes and systems, largely depend on its 
capability to effectively resolve any form of problem that may arise.  
As stated by regime theory, the notion of countries’ participation in such regimes certainly dictates 
their behavior and decision-making processes in relevant events. However, in reality, the 2015 
refugee crisis has revealed multiple shortfalls of such a wide-ranging international refugee regime. 
Firstly, the contemporary definition of a refugee, coined together with the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, “only applies to a narrow subset of migrants” (Sopariwalla, 2017, p. 132). 
Additionally, those who arrive to a host country and cannot prove that they are fleeing from death 
or persecution, can be automatically returned to their country of origin, because the non-
refoulement rule does not apply to them. The challenge with this is actually being able to prove 
the reason of migration, as many migrants do not have personal documents, nor are aware of their 
rights under the 1951 Geneva Convention. This issue, though, leads to possibly the greatest 
obstacle to a perfect functionality of the 1951 Geneva Convention – compliance of its signatory 
states. This issue might not have been so crucial previously; but with one of the greatest refugee 
crises happening, low level of compliance among many of the signatory states created a mess that 
had not been foreseen: “/r/ather than using the Refugee Convention as a blueprint to guide positive 
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action, some States look for the grey areas to confine and restrict their obligations as far as is 
arguably possible’ (McAdam, 2017, pp. 4–5). Similarly, the refugee crisis brought about the need 
for bigger commitments from the signatory states. Unfortunately, the crisis showed a widespread 
“lack of political will to tackle the challenges head-on and accept responsibilities” (McAdam, 
2017, p. 5). Genuine cooperation and commitment to fulfilling the duties posed by the 1951 
Geneva Convention seemed to have become a problem much greater than the 2015 refugee crisis 
itself.  
In the attempts to strengthen the institutional security and protection of refugees and asylum 
seekers, European Union and its institutions have, as previously discusses, created a system of 
refugee protection regimes, which should, ideally, serve as complementary regimes to the 1951 
Geneva Convention. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), although primarily 
established for protection of human rights of European Member States’ citizens, holds several 
provisions regarding the protection of refugees in the territory of European States. However, the 
reality of putting those provisions into practice is different, especially in the case of crisis. As it 
was discussed previously in this research, it has been reported repeatedly how countries with high 
numbers of refugees have been violating human rights. This can happen due to various reasons, 
from lack of infrastructure to support the high saturation of refugees, to lack of funds or even lack 
of political will. Great example of that is the EU-Turkey deal, including Greece as an actor in the 
Deal, which was established on several occasions as very problematic when it comes to human 
rights and proper treatment of refugees. Although Turkey is not a European country and has little 
obligations when it comes to European protection on human rights, the EU, as the entity which 
established the Convention, is fully obliged to comply with its provisions. As told by Schoenhuber 
(2018), the very first sentence of the EU-Turkey Deal is extremely close to being “illegal under 
international law in general and Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
particular” (p. 657). Not only that, but the treatment of refugees, as reported by McEwen (2017, p. 
22) is also in violation of human rights: 
On the Greek islands the harrowing human cost of the deal is laid bare. Not allowed to leave, 
thousands of asylum-seekers live in a tortuous limbo. Women, men and children languish in 
inhumane conditions, sleeping in flimsy tents, braving the snow and are sometimes the victims of 
violent hate crimes. Five refugees on Lesvos, including a child, have died amid such conditions. 
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What is even more concerning is that this example comes from Greek Islands, which are a part of 
Europe, and should be directly held accountable for this failure to provide the refugees with proper 
living conditions. Aside from mere overlooking of the direct human rights violations, another 
problem deepening the question of ineffectiveness is the role of European Court of Human Rights, 
or more precisely, the understanding of its role. It has been the backbone of the human rights case 
law in the European community, establishing definitive interpretations and applications of the 
provisions of the ECHR. One of the main flaws in this system is that “certain obvious failings of 
asylum and immigration law in the Member States have not been brought before the courts” 
(Labayle and De Bruycker, 2012, p. 10). This shows that the role of the ECtHR is oftentimes 
undermined as an entity which should be involved in all cases regarding the rights of refugees and 
asylum seekers. This is furthermore perpetuated with the institutional failure to fulfill the 
designated role. An example of such failure comes from the European Commission, which 
“tolerated the prevailing situation in Greece without referring the matter to the Court for failure to 
fulfil an obligation, despite regular warnings from the European Court of Human Rights” (ibid.). 
So, by undermining the role of the Court in the times of crisis, the Commission has certainly 
prolonged the problem, leading to more challenges that only deepened the crisis. Thus, the 
effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights and related institutions is, as 
demonstrated in the examples, practically negligible in the times of crisis. 
The most comprehensive refugee protection regime in the European region, however, has been the 
Dublin Regulation in the combination with the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The 
Dublin Regulation has been, and still is, the most updated refugee and asylum seeker protection 
regime of the European community – Dublin Regulation IV being in the works currently. It is the 
greatest harmonization project of the EU when it comes to refugee protection and asylum, where 
the CEAS is serving as an extension of the Dublin Regulation and setting minimum standards that 
each of the States should have for refugees and asylum seekers. In addition, these two regimes 
have been put in place in order to control and prevent secondary movements, asylum shopping or 
asylum orbiting. As assumed by regime theory, the effectiveness of these two systems should be 
very high, under the presumption that the normative power of these systems overrides the 
individual interests of the states. However, “/t/here is a discrepancy between the European Union’s 
ambitions to create a harmonized reception system for asylum seekers and the realities on the 
ground” (Brekke and Brochmann, 2015, pp. 145–146). The differences in individual conditions 
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and capabilities greatly impact the states’ abilities to harmonize their policies at the same level 
across the region. In addition, some countries have shown lack of political will to contribute to the 
process, putting their individual interests above their obligation toward the provisions of either the 
Dublin Regulation or the CEAS. In reality then, the combination of factors leads to the very 
phenomena which these systems were made to prevent, most popular one being secondary 
movements. Although the initial version of the Dublin Regulation had little to no focus on the 
redistribution of asylum seekers, but was mainly adopted for the purpose of safeguarding the 
internal EU borders (Denaro and Vassallo Paleologo, 2018, p. 52). Only in the light of the recent 
crisis, the prevention of secondary movements had been made on of the key points of the Dublin 
Regulation III, together with the redistribution of asylum seekers, as some of the states have been 
experiencing immense pressures of their capacities with unforeseen waves of migrants incoming 
(ibid.). Similarly, the CEAS has been developed against “the idea of the EU as ‘an area of 
protection’, where the Member States should be able to guarantee adherence to common 
standards” (Denaro and Vassallo Paleologo, 2018, p. 53). Sadly, it seems as if that homogeneity 
is not plausible among the States. During the migrant crisis, most of the secondary movements 
happened from Italy and Greece, those countries being the two most popular entrance points, as it 
was discussed in the work previously. It had caused for re-evaluation of the Dublin Regulation III 
and the CEAS in order to increase the effectiveness of those systems and prompt a higher level of 
solidarity among the participating States (ibid.). Even in the attempts to resolve the challenge of 
collective cooperation in the times of crisis, “economic interests have evidently prevailed over 
/States’/ responsibilities to burden sharing in terms of human rights” (Denaro and Vassallo 
Paleologo, 2018, p. 59), resulting in lack of provision of basic accommodation and health care to 
refugees and asylum seekers. Ultimately, it seems as if the key points of the CEAS and the Dublin 
Regulation are their greatest shortcomings. The idea of collectivity and policy harmonization has 
certainly been trumped by the need to protect individual interests of participating states, where the 
idea of burden sharing failed completely. 
The peak of the refugee crisis in 2015 has certainly been a perfect challenge to showcase the flaws 
of the refugee protection regimes, or more specifically, the flaws of the complexity of their parallel 
existence. Increased institutional proliferation that had begun in the second half of the 20th Century 
“pose/d/ a challenge to conventional theories of international cooperation and has spurred the 
development of new concepts in international relations” (Alter and Raustiala, 2018, p. 1), in order 
51 
 
to establish their effect of the dynamics of international systems. The levels of those regimes are 
different – international, multilateral, bilateral, and other, less formal levels. To assess the impact, 
scholars have developed regime complexity as a concept, which “conceptualizes how the 
complexity of rules and institutions can, in and of itself, shape the politics of cooperation” (ibid.). 
As it was discussed already in this research, the notion of overlapping refugee protection regimes 
should, ideally, only strengthen the effectiveness of the existing systems, serving as their 
complementary extensions, where the multiplicity of the regimes would eliminate loopholes and 
chances to avoid individual obligations of protection of refugees. Unfortunately, the reality has 
shown to be very different from theory. In reality, those different regimes and systems of norms 
exist in “contradictory ways” (Betts, 2009, p. 53). By offering new strategies and new instruments 
for establishing refugee protection, the new regimes occasionally have a negative effect on the 
overall functionality of refugee protection (ibid.). The parallel existence of these institutions for 
refugee protection offers opportunities to states to work around their obligations toward 
international refugee protection regimes: “/i/nternational refugee law only imposes obligations 
upon states once refugees reach their territory; if they can find alternative ways to avoid refugees 
reaching their territory then they can avoid these legal obligation” (Betts, 2009, p. 54). Similarly, 
Drezner (2009) maintains how the complexity of international regimes can have “contradictory or 
cross-cutting effects” (p. 65), which then lead to “cross-institutional strategizing, the asymmetrical 
distribution of legal and technical expertise, and the fragmentation of reputation, /which/ can 
undermine the significance of institutions in complex environments” (ibid.).  
Institutions, together with their regimes, present an authoritative system which should, as proposed 
in the regime theory, impact the individual behaviors of actors in the international system: “/b/y 
creating a common set of rules or norms for all participants, institutions help to intrinsically define 
the substance of cooperation, while highlighting instances when states defect from the agreed-
upon rules” (ibid.). Hence, the power of institutions and regimes should be in their ability to 
construct a more functional environment, and in the case of refugee and asylum protection, a 
quality environment for those who seek it. Although for some, institutional proliferation and their 
regimes means that “the growth of international regime complexity leads to greater adherence to 
norms” (Drezner, 2009, p. 66), it more often brings problematic effects for the international order. 
In his research, Drezner (2009, p. 66) elaborates the three reasons why regime complexity means 
less effective systems:  
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Regime complexity inevitably increases the number of possible focal points around which rules 
and expectations can converge. /…/ Second, the creation of overlapping legal mandates with 
contradictory mandates could weaken all actors’ sense of legal obligation. Finally, the increased 
complexity of global governance structures raises the transaction costs of compliance for all 
actors. 
 
The increase of focal points can certainly be seen in today’s refugee regimes, where each of the 
regimes proposed different set of norms and rules, creating different expectations for the actors. 
Although occasionally, the expectations seem to overlap in certain points. Nevertheless, the actors 
frequently either cannot, or lack the will meet all of the standards established, so they begin to 
either avoid their responsibilities altogether, or only meet minimal standards to merely satisfy the 
presented expectations. For instance, the Visegrad countries have, during the peak of the refugee 
crisis, closed off their borders and refused to fulfill their obligations under any of the regimes, as 
they perceived those obligations overwhelming. Reasons behind this are different – flawed 
decision-making, in which states began to utilize their power to pursue their goals (e.g. Germany 
and Austria with QMV), unequal burden-sharing and individual capabilities of states. 
Nevertheless, they all result in the same thing - the loss of solidarity among the Member States, 
which will be discussed later in this Chapter. Similarly, the lack of actors’ sense of legal obligation 
was also noticeable throughout the refugee crisis in Europe. Namely, with the existence of multiple 
refugee protection regimes, the participating states managed to avoid their legal obligations with 
little to no consequence for their action. Here, the issue are not necessarily the discrepancies 
between the refugee regimes, but the mere existence of an increased number of norms and rules. 
Consequently, it brings about a range of responsibilities, which states are occasionally unable to 
keep track of (especially in times of crisis), hence they avoided them completely: “the 
fragmentation of reputation /…/ can undermine the significance of institutions in complex 
environments (Drezner, 2013, p. 65). As a result, the countries which failed to participate in their 
obligations toward the established regimes, went unpunished. A great example of the lack of sense 
of legal obligation is the EU, which, by implementing the EU-Turkey Deal, violated several 
provisions from different refugee protection regimes, those being the 1951 Geneva Convention 
and the European Convention on Human Rights. In the times of crisis, many individual actors start 
to weigh out the benefits and costs of their compliance with refugee protections regimes. With 
multiple regimes in place, many actors choose to protect their own interests instead of abiding by 
the rules imposed by the regimes, since the costs of that become too high for them. This then 
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results in a similar situation – lack of solidarity among the actors, as is was the case during the 
refugee crisis. It seems as if the countries and the EU itself, return to individual interests when it 
comes to unexpected and difficult challenges, which then leads to systematic failure of different 
regimes and safeguards, the roles of which become abstract at best, without having the power to 
make the change.  
Inevitably, the multiplicity and overlapping of different refugee protection regimes in unavoidable, 
since institutional proliferation is an ongoing process, especially with the rise of unprecedented 
phenomena. What is important, but has yet to be established, is the most efficient and effective 
strategy, with which the challenges of regime complexity could be made into constructive values 
of such systems. According to Alter and Raustiala (2018), there are two functional approaches to 
resolve this issue: “(a) International actors can attempt to create an encompassing regime that can 
address all dimensions of the problem, or (b) international actors can accept that policy solutions 
will be crafted, coordinated, and implemented within a larger regime complex” (p. 9). Although 
the first option would potentially be a more permanent solution, it faces different challenges, 
example being a further increase in institutional proliferation for refugee protection, only added to 
the existing such institutions. Probably the greatest challenge would be that “adding new 
institutions can be easier than changing or dismantling existing institutions” (ibid.). It is something 
that many institutions opt for today – establishing new, daughter-institutions with more particular 
focus on certain issue is much easier than renewing the fundamental values and work of an already 
existing body. In the case of the refugee crisis, it became easier to create a new regime (the EU-
Turkey Deal), than adjusting already existing systems, such as the Dublin Regulation III (an 
attempt of which had failed). This also then contributes to the increased institutional proliferation, 
raising the number of overlapping regimes. Likewise, the question of “modernity” of some long-
standing institutions can necessitate the creation of new regimes, which could establish 
contemporary strategies for contemporary challenges (ibid.).  
Even though it is not the sole problem for the lack of effective management and cooperation among 
states, regime complexity certainly complicates the situation, making it “harder for individuals to 
understand which actors, institutions, and rules apply” (Alter and Raustiala, 2018, p. 11). 
Additionally, “it is more difficult for any one institution to assert authority with respect to issues 
that fall under their domain; and it is more difficult to hold national and global institutions 
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accountable for outcomes” (ibid.). Bottom line being that regime complexity equals instability, 
where decision-making within one entity can be “unsettled, undermined, or replaced by decisions 
and actions within another part of the complex” (Alter and Raustiala, 2018, p. 12). The reality is 
that, contemporary phenomena necessitate regime complexity. Often, it causes diverse behaviors 
among actors, where institutional authority and power fade, giving opportunities for those actors 
to avoid their responsibilities. Thus, the solution for this is not to accept the lack of functionality 
of those systems, but to find strategies of keeping participating actors accountable and responsible. 
 
4.1 Burden-sharing vs. individual interests 
The 2015 refugee crisis put to test the compatibility and the effectiveness of the existing 
international refugee protection regimes, revealing both strengths and flaws of the same. Some 
authors defined the 2015 refugee crisis as beyond the capabilities of existing regimes, where its 
scope outgrew expectations and the readiness of states and actors involved in the process 
(McKenzie and Brandt, 2016). Additionally, Dustmann et al. (2017, p. 500) discusses this refugee 
crisis as creating a trifold of political challenges:  
First, and most important, European nations can only marginally influence the primary causes of 
the conflicts inducing current refugee flows. There is thus no clear indication of when such flows 
might abate, and no clear time frame for when those who have fled the conflict can be resettled, if 
at all. /…/ Second, the dire economic situations in which many European countries find themselves, 
coupled with the different views about humanitarian responsibilities, impede political progress and 
solutions. Last, the lack of a clear legal framework; the unsuitability of past regulations, which have 
led to confusing ad hoc exceptions; the differences in implementation and interpretation of the 
underlying Geneva Convention for Refugees (GCR) across European countries; and the challenges 
that the current crisis poses for the Schengen Agreement have led to a situation in which political 
progress is proving extremely difficult. 
 
Subsequently, other experts saw the fault in the implementation of existing regimes, where the 
involved actors undermined the magnitude of the crisis, allowing it to peak beyond abilities of the 
international community to act quickly and efficiently (Dobra, 2013). Even though, as Dustmann 
discusses, there can be no clear warning signs on the magnitude and the exact timing of such 
refugee flows, certainly, the above-mentioned differences in views on the responsibilities have 
greatly impacted the course of the refugee crisis in Europe. One of the most detrimental failures 
of the international community in regard to the refugee crisis was the failure of burden-sharing and 
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acceptance of individual responsibilities. The issue of burden-sharing, however, is not only based 
in the willingness of individual states to contribute to solving the crisis, but the existing refugee 
and asylum regimes partially perpetuate the problem of unequal participation in the crisis. For 
example, as it was mentioned previously, one of the fundamental ideas of the Dublin Regulation 
is the “country of first entry” provision, which puts a lot of pressure on the countries that are the 
entrance points for the refugees, such as Italy and Greece (McEwen, 2017). Furthermore, when 
the magnitude of the refugee crisis has surpassed the capabilities of those countries, other signatory 
states of the Dublin Regulation rejected the idea of permanent resettlement quotas, which 
demonstrates the lack of solidarity among them, and the lack of authority of the international 
regimes for refugee protection. 
The true challenge of burden-sharing, however, is not in the organization of international refugee 
protection regimes. In order for basic values of solidarity, fairness and burden-sharing around 
which most of the international regimes are built to be effective, the participating states must be 
highly aware of them and willing to comply with them at all times. Unfortunately, the refugee 
crisis has revealed just how unwilling the states are to take on the burden and collectively work on 
resolving the issues. Accepting and taking care of refugees and asylum seekers comes at high costs: 
“/e/conomically, states are concerned about resettling refugees because of the direct costs of 
subsistence, schooling, healthcare, and the determining process” (McEwen, 2017, p. 26). For 
instance, “Britain spends about 30,000 euros per asylum seeker” (ibid.). Aside from economic 
concerns, many states fear social consequences of large influx of migrants: “foreign asylum-
seekers create social tensions, especially within the relatively homogenous populations of most 
EU member states” (ibid.), which then also brings about political tensions too. The combination 
of these factors makes the states reluctant to take the refugees in and actually comply with the 
burden-sharing responsibilities of the established refugee protection regimes. McEwen (2017) 
adds state level reasoning behind the failure of burden-sharing as well, stating that actors have “a 
shortsighted conceptualization of the refugee crisis on the individual level” (p. 26), which then 
leads to less effective, and in the long-term, more damaging strategies for resolving the refugee 
crisis: “EU policymakers failed to recognize that closing borders will not reduce migration flows 
in the long run” (ibid.). 
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In the initial years of the crisis, the discrepancies in the readiness of states to receive the refugees 
were great. While the Visegrad group countries had only partially complied with their obligations 
under the refugee protection regimes, Germany had adopted ‘an open doors’ policy in August 
2015, accepting large numbers of incoming migrants (800,000) in order to neutralize the crisis as 
soon as possible. Such decision-making surely contributed to the culture of unequal sharing of the 
burden of the refugee crisis, where less involved countries managed to successfully avoid having 
to take on the burden of the refugee crisis. According to Noallkaemper (2013), these oscillating 
ideas on responsibilities regarding management of refugees come from the values presented in 
different international refugee protection regimes, where asylum and refugees become “a 
collective responsibility of the 47 states that are parties to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and members of the Council of Europe, and that make up Europe at large” (p. 
361). Even so, not any collectivity makes for the presumed burden-sharing culture. Namely, 
“refugees’ rights are not to be compromised. It is only so long as all rights of persons defined as 
refugees are honored, that sharing responsibility to protect asylum seekers is permissible” (ibid.). 
That being said, while the value of collectivity is emphasized through the regimes, at the same 
time, they are potential causes of increased discrepancies among the states in reality. It seems as 
if the “shared response of European states for handling asylum seekers and refugees may at times 
be effective and help promote global regimes” (ibid.), but has been proven to be of rather 
temporary nature. Issues arise with the dilution of “the individual responsibility of each individual 
European state in the performance of its international obligations” (Noallkaemper, 2013, p. 364). 
In addition, through the lens of international law, ”while /it/ relies on the EU and other regional 
arrangements to implement the global refugee regime effectively, it does not allow individual 
states to back out of their individual obligations by engaging in regional arrangements” (ibid.). 
Overall, it can be seen how, when taken in theory, the complexity of international refugee 
protection regimes should function as a mutually complementing system, only eliminating the 
potential opportunities for avoiding responsibilities. Instead, the same complexity of discussed 
refugee protection regimes creates more opportunities for promoting individual interests over 
international obligations. If it weren’t for the refugee crisis in Europe, these institutional and 
systematic issues might not have been revealed, since such intense cooperation hadn’t been 
necessary in decades. Additionally, the refugee crisis meant, for most of the states involved, 
putting individual state interests behind and prioritize resolving a phenomenon potentially 
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detrimental for many states’ economic and social well-being. Over the course of the crisis and with 
its intensification, it has been seen how individual interest trumped the internationally established 
obligations set by different global and regional refugee protection regimes. Ultimately, the 
European solidarity and collectivity had failed repeatedly, resulting in serious violations of 
different international refugee protection regimes provisions, some of which are a part of 
international customary law. Altogether, the refugee crisis has caused serious failure of the refugee 
protection systems, and has shown the realistic ineffectiveness of the same.  
For many, the issues presented in this work are rather outdated. However, the importance of this 
research, as already said, lies in the analysis of the combination of factors which led to a rather 
dysfunctional behavior of international and European community, revealing fundamental flaws in 
refugee protection regimes and their application. Furthermore, the issues discussed in this paper, 
such as regime complexity and burden-sharing challenges, transcend the refugee crisis and 
translate into other potential challenges. These issues are not new, they had only surfaced because 
of the intensity of the refugee crisis, which necessitated urgent and collective action from all 
participating states. The reality has shown the existing discrepancies between theoretical and 
proactive establishment of different values and regimes among states of dissimilar economic, 
social and political capabilities.  
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, I address the following research question: How effectively have existing 
international refugee protection regimes addressed and resolved the 2015 refugee crisis? The 
importance of this question is multilateral. Firstly, the question considers the big picture, which is 
at times disregarded in the process of resolving an issue. Norms, principles, rules and other 
procedures responsible for refugee protection are focused on their individual successes. 
Subsequently, they fail to see the collective effectiveness or ineffectiveness of different refugee 
protection regimes. Hence, this question allows the readers to understand the wider context of 
international refugee protection and see how those individual regimes function as a whole. 
Secondly, in order to successfully address the question, this thesis has to analyze every refugee 
protection regime on a universal (UN) and regional (EU) level relevant to the refugee crisis, and 
the history of the same, so it could establish well-rounded understanding of the necessity for 
existence of each of those regimes. Thirdly, this research question requires for the issue of 
hierarchy and overlapping regimes to be examined, as to prove of disapprove the functionality of 
different international refugee regime elements. Overall, the question looks at diverse groups of 
factors, which altogether, create a detailed response and an outlook on the discrepancies between 
the ‘on paper’ and actual effectiveness of international refugee protection regimes.  
In the central analysis of this thesis, there are a few underlined issues, that have become very 
impactful factors on the course of the refugee crisis. Although it is not the only issue behind the 
lack of efficient administration and cooperation among states, regime complexity certainly 
complicates the situation. It blurs the hierarchy of different regimes, enabling the state’s avoidance 
of participation in joint problem-solving processes. In times of an ever-increasing regime 
proliferation, regime complexity equals instability, where decision-making within one entity can 
be challenged or undermined by decision-making within another entity (Alter and Raustiala, 
2018). Moreover, regime complexity, unequal capacities, and individual state interests have 
revealed another rather essential issue – unequal burden-sharing. As it was mentioned before in 
this research, burden-sharing seems to be quite fundamental value within virtually every refugee 
protection regime. Equal distribution of responsibilities and burdens of the refugee crisis, while 
constantly emphasized in discussions regarding refugee protection regimes, has been largely 
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disregarded, or even neglected by the participating states. The disregard has gone two ways: while 
some states (e.g. Germany) have neglected the burden-sharing and took on additional burden 
during the crisis, other states (e.g. Hungary; Slovakia) have refused to take on their fair share of 
the burden in the crisis. Thus, the already existing discrepancies had only become more perpetual. 
Not only that, but such state behavior has undermined the values established by different refugee 
protection regimes, which are set up primarily to impose norms and regulation which should 
prevent such deviations. Overall, it seems that majority of the assumed power of international 
refugee protection regimes stayed only ‘on paper’. The somewhat chaotic nature of the refugee 
crisis has certainly revealed the reality of effectiveness of those regimes. It has shown that, since 
the refugee protection regimes largely rely on compliance on states, there should potentially be a 
more authoritative way of imposing the norms and rules, so all participating states would be aware 
and compliant with those at all times, with little to no opportunities to avoid individual 
responsibilities.   
As to properly address the issues of the 2015 refugee crisis, this research paper presented a 
thorough analysis of the historical development of the refugee protection regimes. Starting with 
the most fundamental document, the 1951 Geneva Convention, it was shown how the 
contemporary definition of a refugee came to be, and which influences have happened in order for 
it to successfully address different aspects of migration and refugee recognition. The 1952 Geneva 
Convention, due to its long-standing tradition and high effectiveness in resolving different 
migration challenges globally, has become a part of international customary law, which makes its 
authority even more powerful among its signatory states. The function of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention extends into other refugee protection and asylum regimes. Most of those regimes are 
more recent but have drawn many ideas from the Convention since it has many essential values 
laid out. The most relevant regimes in regard to the refugee crisis, other than the Convention, are 
the European Convention on Human Rights, the Dublin Regulation(s) and the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS). Each of these has a particular role in asylum and refugee protection. By 
analyzing the details of each of the regimes, this research established deeper understanding of the 
strengths and potential weaknesses of every regime and simultaneously established ground for 
further analysis of the effectiveness of those regimes. Additionally, demonstrating the theoretical 
application of the regimes in contrast to their realization during the crisis showed the existing 
discrepancies between expectations and the reality of capabilities to meet those same expectations.  
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Furthermore, to create understanding of the nature of the refugee crisis, the added historical context 
of the Arab Spring depicts several aspects of the crisis. Firstly, it explains the source and the 
breaking points of the Arab Spring movement, which was crucial for the migration movements 
toward Europe. Secondly, the history of the Arab Spring adds more sense to the demographics of 
the migration movements in Europe, which partially influenced the decision-making among some 
European states. And thirdly, it offers potential explanations the unreadiness of the European 
nations for the magnitude of the migration waves. The series of events in the Middle East and 
North African region have yielded millions of externally displaced people seeking refuge in other 
countries. Consequently, the Mediterranean had become the most popular route for the people to 
cross to Europe, losing many lives and bringing Europe to the peak of the refugee crisis. 
Nonetheless, the importance of the historical context of the crisis given in this paper lays in the 
generalizability of the analysis – it shows that the challenges that had arisen in the crisis are 
applicable to different contexts. The decision-making and issues regarding the effectiveness of the 
refugee regimes was not cause by the causal location of the crisis, but with the realistic 
discrepancies among the states in their capabilities and willingness to act as mandated in given 
regimes. 
The overwhelming inflows of the refugees caused several reactions from Europe, some of which 
were in violation of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the ECHR. The strongest example given in 
the analysis was the EU-Turkey Deal, which served as a temporary solution to the failing capacities 
of Greece, which was the entrance point for majority of migrants taking the Eastern Mediterranean 
Route. The EU-Turkey Deal has raised many questions on the actual effectiveness of the 
agreement, where most of the crisis challenges were addressed poorly and inadequately, 
additionally violating provisions from the 1951 Geneva Convention and the ECHR. This deal has 
been used by Turkey to gain more political leverage against EU and has certainly demonstrated 
the shortfalls of international refugee protection regimes in place.  
The contextualization of different aspects of the refugee crisis – evolution of refugee regimes, 
history behind the crisis and the manifestation of migration crisis in Europe – have been used to 
pinpoint the challenges which led to such immense crisis in Europe, and their meaning for a more 
general application. When taken separately, each of the regimes has revealed some fundamental 
flaws which led to less effective management of the crisis, ultimately prolonging the problem. In 
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regime theory, the main idea is that the regimes – norms, rules and other provisions – guide the 
behavior of states; mostly, when establishing regimes, actors are led by that notion. In reality, 
however, especially in times of crises, the regimes are trumped by protection of individual state 
interests, which was widely demonstrated throughout the crisis. As it was already mentioned, the 
lack of political will seems to have been the most profound issue, where some countries completely 
failed to oblige by the given regimes (the Visegrad group). This issue has also translated into the 
adaptability of regimes to new phenomena – in the process of renewing the Dublin Regulation III 
in order to properly address newly-arisen challenges, states have rejected to participate in the 
burden-sharing of the crisis, emphasizing the state interests over the collective security and 
cooperation. Hence, the capabilities of the regimes to quickly adjust to different challenges has 
been hindered by the lack of collective contribution to the refugee crisis.  
Aside from lessened effectiveness of refugee protection regimes, regime complexity represents 
another challenge to a harmonized and well-ordered functioning of different regimes. Due to the 
existence of multiple regimes, chances for overlapping values and even contradicting obligations 
are high. Consequently, the systematic usefulness of regimes is decreased, and the countries find 
multiple ways to avoid their responsibilities toward said regimes. Also, the heightened regime 
complexity oftentimes lessens the states’ sense of legal obligation, which then enables them to 
have lower tendency to abide by norms and rules established. The notion of higher costs due to 
higher regime complexity is yet another impacting factor, which most often motivates the 
participating states to prioritize individual interests and welfare instead of collective action to seek 
resolution to the challenge. Certainly, the refugee crisis in Europe has revealed multi-layered 
institutional and systematic flaws, where the costs of burden-sharing are overly high for most of 
the actors, which then turn to protection of internal interests, causing a failure of refugee protection 
regimes in power. Sadly, it has been shown that the lack of effectiveness of international refugee 
protection regimes lays more in the unwillingness and inability of participating states to truly 
contribute to resolving the crisis than in the application of such regimes. In order to properly 
address the issues, the regimes are established to address, they must rely on the willingness of all 
states to do their part equally. As this research shows, this aspect of the refugee protection regimes 
has failed, hence creating new challenges for Europe and international community to resolve. 
Burden-sharing, although still a fundamental value in many regimes, oftentimes fails because the 
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expectations of that burden-sharing become overwhelming for the actors involved, hence creating 
an opposite reaction and resulting in eventual breakdown of the regimes.  
Even though there have been many research papers done on this topic, not many have been done 
in the same manner. This research paper offers a comprehensive analysis of different impacting 
factors of the 2015 refugee crisis, which have led to multi-faceted issues, some of which are yet to 
be fully resolved by the international community. The main contribution of this research is, 
however, the generalizability of this analysis – the institutional and systematic issues that have 
been revealed throughout the refugee crisis have been around before it. Whereas the focus of most 
refugee crisis-related research is on the narrowed-down, refugee-specific aspects, this research 
leaves more space for widespread application of findings to other fields of research. The refugee 
crisis is only the spark, which has caused the perfect storm of failed burden-sharing, normative 
flaws and flawed decision-making, all of which can transcend into any other form of crisis, and 
another system of regimes. It is important to realize the general applicability of problematic 
elements analyzed in this research paper, which could be of great assistance to future research on 
problematic regimes and potential consequences of allowing the circumstances to guide the 
decision-making processes, ultimately causing for existing norms and rules to be neglected and 
overlooked. It is of fundamental importance to utilize this knowledge in order to contribute to 
evolution of new and improved regimes, which could help the participating states in increasing 
their readiness for any potential issue, simultaneously enabling protection of both individual and 
collective interests.  
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6 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS IN SLOVENIAN LANGUAGE 
 
Zadnja begunska kriza v Evropi je hkrati tudi največja po drugi svetovni vojni. Poleg tega je 
pomenila veliko obremenitev za države in vse, ki so bili vključeni v njeno reševanje. Pričujoča 
raziskava se osredotoča na izzive, pred katere so bile postavljene mednarodne skupnosti v zadnjih 
šestih letih – prevelik pritok beguncev in njegov vpliv na učinkovitost in delovanje mednarodnih 
sistemov begunske zaščite. S teorijo režimov želim natančno preučiti strukturo mednarodnih 
sistemov za zaščito beguncev – tako tiste, ki krepijo, kot tiste, ki šibijo obstoječe sisteme režimov 
za zaščito beguncev. Osrednje zastavljeno vprašanje je: Kako učinkoviti so bili obstoječi sistemi 
za zaščito beguncev pri ukvarjanju z begunsko krizo iz leta 2015 in pri njenem reševanju? 
Z vpogledom v kompleksen in večplasten sistem prekrivajočih se režimov magistrsko delo 
omogoča uvid v resnično stanje njihove kolektivne učinkovitosti v praksi. Za namene preverjanja 
zmogljivosti omenjenih sistemov je bil izbran študij primera begunske krize v Evropi iz leta 2015, 
ki služi kot sodoben in zelo problematičen primer, pri katerem sta se pokazali moč in 
pomanjkljivost mednarodnih sistemov za zaščito beguncev. 
Študijski primer zajema približno obdobje med leti 2011 in 2018. Leto 2015 je pomembno, ker ga 
veliko strokovnjakov priznava kot leto, v katerem je begunska kriza dosegla vrhunec v Evropi, 
nadaljuje pa se tudi v leto 2016 (Park, 2015; Dobra, 2016, str. 92; van Prooijen et al., 2017, str. 
143). Izbor letnice 2011 je utemeljen z zgodovino krize – vstaja arabske pomladi v letih 2010–
2011 je napovedala prihajajočo krizo (Doomen, 2013, str. 400). Kmalu po vstaji arabske pomladi 
v letih 2010–2011 se je začela kriza. S predstavitvijo zgodovinskega ozadja krize in geografskim 
izvorom beguncev, ki so prihajali v Evropo, raziskava prispeva k razumevanju različnih vidikov 
obravnavanih virov, kot so poti prihoda in izzivi, ki jih je prinesla kriza. 
Za zagotavljanje celostnega razumevanja in analize različnih vidikov raziskave so uporabljeni 
primarni in sekundarni viri. Primarni viri, uporabljeni na različnih mestih v delu, so Ženevska 
konvencija iz leta 1951, Dublinska uredba, Evropska konvencija o človekovih pravicah in Skupni 
evropski azilni sistem (CEAS). Ti dokumenti ponujajo natančne norme in pravila, ki so značilna 
za mednarodne sisteme za zaščito beguncev. 
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Poleg različnih pogodb in konvencij bodo uporabljeni primarni viri še podatkovne baze številnih 
internacionalnih inštitucij, ki so neposredno vključene v pomoč beguncem in njihovo upravljanje 
(npr. Visoki komisariat za begunce, Evropska unija). Kot pomemben vir informacij bodo služili 
tudi različni dopisi, poročila in podobni dokumenti, ki so jih izdale pomembne inštitucije v času 
krize. Sekundarni viri bodo različne analize in raziskave, ki bodo služile predstavitvi različnih 
nazorov in perspektiv, s čimer bo analiza dobila na dodani vrednosti. 
Struktura dela je organizirana sistematično, od splošnejših do bolj specifičnih tem, ki jih 
nadgrajujejo zaključna analiza in rezultati. Cilj 2. poglavja je tako predstaviti zgodovinski razvoj 
in razvoj mednarodnih sistemov za zaščito beguncev, od njihovih začetkov do visoko 
kompleksnih, večplastnih sistemov norm, načel in pravil, ki danes usmerjajo delovanje različnih 
vpletenih. Poglavje bo pokazalo, kako so nastale temeljne vrednote in ideje sodobnih mednarodnih 
sistemov za zaščito beguncev. Upoštevani bodo najbolj zadevni mednarodni dokumenti, ki so 
vzpostavili opisane sisteme, kot so Ženevska konvencija iz leta 1951, Dublinske uredbe, Evropska 
konvencija o človekovih pravicah in Skupni evropski azilni sistem (CEAS). 
V nadaljevanju se v 3. poglavju raziskava osredotoča na vzpostavljanje zgodovinskega konteksta 
begunske krize – z vstajo arabske pomladi v letih 2010–2011. Ta je hitro zajela različne države in 
regije ter povzročila vrsto vstaj in nemirov s hudimi posledicami, med katerimi je bila tudi 
begunska kriza v Evropi. Begunski valovi so potekali po različnih poteh, od katerih je vsak prinesel 
različne izzive Evropi in preostanku mednarodne skupnosti. 
Pod močnim pritiskom begunskih valov je Evropa dosegla sporazum za naseljevanje beguncev, 
sporazum EU-Turčija, ki je problem rešil samo začasno in je še povečal obseg krize. To je eden 
izmed najbolj očitnih primerov pomanjkljivega odločanja vključenih v begunsko krizo. 
Raziskava se zaključi s 4. poglavjem, ki ponuja natančen pregled pomanjkljivosti vsakega od 
relevantnih sistemov za zaščito beguncev v Evropi skozi perspektivo teorije režimov. Izpostavljeni 
so izzivi prilagoditve sistema na krizo, primanjkljaj porazdelitve bremen med državami, problemi 
zaradi kompleksnosti sistemov in prevladujoči državni interesi nad kolektivnimi ukrepi, ki so vsi 
nujni za učinkovito reševanje krize. 
Glavni doprinos te raziskave je možnost posplošitve analize – institucionalne in sistemske težave, 
ki so se pokazale med begunsko krizo, so v resnici obstajale že pred njo. 
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Begunska kriza je samo vzvod, ki je povzročil zaporedje neuspešnih delitev bremen, neustrezne 
norme in pomanjkljive odločitve, ki se lahko nadaljujejo v katero koli drugo obliko krize in v 
drugačen sistem režimov. 
Pomembno je prepoznati možnost posplošitve in uporabnost analize kritičnih elementov raziskave. 
Ta je lahko v pomoč pri nadaljnjih raziskavah težavnih sistemov in možnih posledic, ki se lahko 
zgodijo, če prepustimo nadzor nad situacijo trenutnim okoliščinam,  ki se kažejo v neupoštevanju 
obstoječih norm in pravil. Uporaba tega znanja je temeljnega pomena za prispevanje k razvoju 
novih in izboljšanih režimov, ki lahko pomagajo vključenim državam izboljšati njihovo 
pripravljenost na morebitne težave in hkrati omogočajo tako zaščito individualnih kot tudi 
kolektivnih interesov. 
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